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The Community Broadband Investment Act, or House Bill 282, was introduced in the 
Georgia legislature in 2012 and 2013, and is likely to be introduced again in the next coming 
years.  The legislation, which failed to pass the Georgia House of Representatives in March 2013 
by a vote of 70-92, would practically restrict the ability of municipal governments to invest in 
broadband infrastructure if the area is already being served by a provider with speeds of at least 
3 Mbps, a relatively low threshold for bandwidth speeds. Advocates of the bill argue that 
government entry into the telecommunications market to provide internet service as a utility 
has the effect of crowding out private sector competition, providing inferior quality of service, 
and not having a comprehensive business model or best practices.  When looking at the history 
of utility provision, particularly with the electricity and cable TV industries, the private sector 
typically provides services in urban areas where there is a higher demand and a greater return 
on investment of the sunk costs invested into infrastructure, and the public sector has been 
known to step in and provide the services themselves forming government-owned utility 
companies.  A variety of economic doctrines justify this type of government entrance into a 
utility market motivated by the desire to serve the residents if their demand is not adequately 
met and the promise of positive externalities such as economic development and a better 
quality of life.  Interviews with subject-matter experts and case studies of municipal broadband in 
Georgia suggest that municipal ownership of the broadband utility has advantages in its ability  to 
spread out infrastructure investment costs over longer periods of time than the private sector, 
ability to keep revenues within the municipality that can  recirculate back into the local 
economy, and ability to provide a greater quality and more reliable level of service to its 
xiii 
 
customers on account of its local presence, ability to meet specific demands of its customers, 
and its enhanced role in its responsibility to the public.   
The ideas that motivated the introduction of the Georgia legislation may over-generalize 
and simplify characteristics of community-owned networks. The deliberation process of 
investing in a network is a lengthy process that depends on both market and non-market 
factors.   Municipalities vary widely in their relationship and degree of cooperation with the local 
private provider, as well as the specific allowances of their government charters, importance of 
technology to their businesses and residents, and the community’s general level of comfort with 
local government provision of utilities.  The policy direction restricting municipal broadband 
should not be pursued on a state level in Georgia because communities have highly varied and 
rapidly changing needs, and they need to be able to leverage their advantages with those of the 
private sector.  While municipalities may not choose to directly provide telecommunications 
services, the bill would dissuade municipal involvement and restrict their flexibility to respond to 
rapidly growing demand for high bandwidth applications and integrated information systems, 










1.1. The Debate in Georgia over Municipal Broadband 
On Thursday, March 7th 2013, the Georgia House of Representatives voted down House 
Bill 282, the Community Broadband Investment Act, introduced by Rep. Mark Hamilton (R-
Cumming), by a vote of 70-92.  Advocated by big telecommunications companies, primarily 
AT&T and Windstream, the bill would prevent local governments from building a municipal 
broadband network in areas where an Internet Service Provider (ISP) delivers speeds of at least 
three megabits per second (Mbps) and prohibit current providers from expanding their service 
outside existing coverage areas
1
 (For text of the bill, see Appendix A). The Atlanta Journal 
Constitution reported that Rep. Hamilton introduced the bill on the grounds that “allowing 
cities, with unlimited tax dollars, to compete with private companies erodes the free market and 
is a waste of taxpayer money.”
2
  A similar bill was introduced in 2012 by Rep. Chip Rogers, and it 
is likely to be introduced again.  
1.2. Research Objective 
The objective of this study is to evaluate opposing perspectives in the debate about the 
role and effectiveness of government investment in wireline (a.k.a. terrestrial) broadband 
infrastructure based on historical trends, economic perspectives, and case studies and assess 
the criticisms that municipal networks crowd out competition, provide poor service to the 
community, and lack a business model or best practices.  The hypothesis is that these arguments 
are misleading and the passage of restrictions on municipal broadband in Georgia would 
negatively impact broadband deployment.   
2 
 
Chapter 1 defines municipal broadband and presents arguments for and against the 
proposed Georgia policy to limit government investment in broadband infrastructure. Chapter 2 
outlines the major influences on the history of utility regulation, and telecommunications in 
particular, in order to shed light on the historical extent of government involvement in utility 
provision and regulation. Chapter 3 describes different economic viewpoints on government 
involvement in utilities and the broadband market, presents various models of municipal 
involvement in broadband, and describes technology alternatives for providing internet. Chapter 
4 presents the research design and data collection methods used to evaluate municipal 
networks in Georgia. Chapter 5 reports on case studies in Georgia, interviews with local 
economic development authorities, and opinions of subject-matter experts to give a perspective 
of how municipal networks originate, how they are funded, the role they play in community 
anchor institutions, and their effect on economic development. Chapter 6 returns to the 
arguments against municipal broadband in the context of the research and case studies. Finally, 
Chapter 7 concludes the paper with a prescription to the state of Georgia not to adopt policies 
restricting municipal broadband so communities can continue to have the flexibility to make 
economic development decisions in the broadband market suitable to their individual needs.  
1.3. Defining Municipal Broadband 
Municipal broadband, also referred to as community broadband, publicly-held networks, or 
Government-Operated Networks (GONs), are local government initiatives to build broadband 
infrastructure and provide operational service to the local customer base.  Georgia’s Community 
Broadband Investment Act HB 282 describes municipal networks as “public providers of 
broadband services,” and defines “public provider” as:  
“any county, municipal corporation, or other political subdivision of this state which 
provides broadband service, whether directly, indirectly, or through any authority or 
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instrumentality acting on behalf of or jointly with other providers, for the benefit of 
any country, municipal corporation, or other political subdivisions of this state.”3   
A municipal network may be used to solely serve anchor institutions like government 
buildings, libraries, schools, and possibly fire, police, and other city facilities; it may be expanded 
to provide connectivity to businesses and commercial entities; or it may extend to serve the 
residents of the municipality.  Depending on the local government charter, the network may 
extend outside the immediate jurisdiction of the municipality’s geographical boundaries, and 
provide service to surrounding cities and counties.  Operations, maintenance, and customer 
service of the network is typically provided as a separate telecommunications public utility 
service, a regulated resource like electricity, water, sewer, and natural gas.  Depending on the 
type of infrastructure, the utility may provide triple-play services of internet, television, and 
telephone over the network, but at the very least, it serves as an ISP of broadband services.  
1.4. Opponents to Community Involvement Advocating Passage of HB 282 
In Georgia, the debate over House Bill 282 reflects the general policy debate over municipal 
networks happening in many state legislatures across the country.  Incumbent providers AT&T, 
Windstream, Verizon, and Time Warner Cable, joined by prominent think-tank, the American 
Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), are the primary stakeholders pushing Georgia to adopt 
policy in opposition to municipal broadband.
4
  
These stakeholders have laid out several arguments for the bill. The first argument is that 
government diminishes competition by crowding out private investment because it undermines 
existing private sector efforts, distorts the market through with unfair advantages, and sets 
prices arbitrarily. Secondly, government provides a poorer quality of service than the private 
sector. Finally, municipal broadband lacks a comprehensive business strategy and a set of best 
practices which enable the private sector to be more successful than municipal providers.   
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1.4.1. Government Entry Crowds out Private Competition 
Perhaps the main argument against government investment in broadband infrastructure 
and service provision is that it has a high probability of crowding out private competition by 
undermining existing private sector efforts and discouraging  market entry,  distorting the 
market through unfair advantages in financing, and setting arbitrary prices for service.   
1.4.1.1. Government-Entrance into the Market Undermines the Private Sector 
Critics of municipal broadband argue that government entry leads to overbuilding existing 
networks, which inhibits private sector efforts to provide service and infrastructure upgrades in 
the local area because it separates the potential customer base and yields less revenue. 
Researchers Banerjee and Sirbu find that “if both the cable carrier and local telecommunications 
deploy neighborhood fiber, it may turn out that the resulting competition is so severe 
(“Bertrand-like”) that neither carrier can realize revenues sufficient to sustain investment in 
expanding capabilities and services.”
5
  In a statement, Eric Einhorn, the senior vice president of 
government affairs for Windstream, said the company "does not believe that it is good public 
policy for government-owned networks to overbuild and undermine existing networks that have 
been constructed with significant private sector investment."
6
  
1.4.1.2. Government has an Unfair Advantage over the Private Sector 
Government has the responsibility to regulate internet infrastructure in ways that 
companies cannot.
 7
  Government dictates local ordinances that affect the private sector, 
including “rights-of-way, utility pole attachments, road and building construction codes, zoning 





criticism is that government networks may price below cost by subsidizing its prices with other 
utilities’ revenue.   
An opponent of municipal broadband, Joseph Furh writes:  
“Government…does not face the same burden of taxes, cost of capital, rights of way 
and liability insurance. Private firms are subject income, sales and real estate taxes, as 
well as franchise and right-of-way fees. Government controls local taxes and right-of-
way fees, so they are generally waived for GONs. Government –owned networks may 
also receive a lower cost of capital because their risks are lower as a result of their 
investment being backed by the government. Freedom from taxes is a special 
advantage to GONs since telecommunications services is one of the most highly taxed, 
if not the mostly highly taxed, industry”9 
 
Similarly, Jeffrey Eisenach writes: 
 
“[municipal providers] are able to issue tax-free (and implicitly government-backed) 
debt; they have access to public rights of way on terms not available to private 
companies; they avoid franchise fees and other taxes private firms must pay; they are 
not subject to Generally Accepted Accounting Practices applied to private companies; 
and, they often receive interest free loans or outright public subsidies.”10 
 
1.4.1.3. Government sets Prices Arbitrarily 
Setting prices for a government-provided service can be difficult without market 
competition.  The government has the power to set monopolistic prices that may result in a 
distorted balance of supply and demand, which leads to service shortages or to discouraging 
competition. According to Joseph Furh, when Chattanooga deployed a fiber-to-the-home 
network, they did not know what price to set, so they set an arbitrary price after infrastructure 
was completed.
11
  Similarly, in Bristol, in the absence of price knowledge, they set the prices to 
that of the primary competitor in the area, Sprint.  Since the government cannot declare 
bankruptcy or exit the market like a private firm, it may have to charge very high prices in the 
attempt to recover the investment, which is unlikely to a company because it will not invest in 
areas that are not going to be cost-effective.  
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1.4.2. Poorer Quality of Service 
Government-run enterprises are often criticized for being slow to change to market 
conditions and are less efficient than private businesses.  Critics point to Amtrak and USPS as 
government provided services competing poorly against private providers.
12
 Government 
provided services can stagnate in upgrading infrastructure which the competitive private sector 
cannot afford to do, while at the same time deterring further entry into the market due to the 
advantage of their regulatory powers. Jeffrey Eisenach, a critic of municipal broadband write:  
“The evidence suggests that such entry will not achieve its desired goals of lower costs 
and more rapid deployment of efficient telecommunications systems. To the contrary, 
government entities are not well suited to compete in the dynamic world of 
telecommunications. Governments that have entered the telecommunications 
business have been saddled with financial losses and obsolete, legacy technologies.”13 
1.4.3. Lack of Best Practices 
The American legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) is the foremost prominent advocacy group 
representing big telecommunications companies behind successful efforts to restrict municipal 
broadband in nineteen states.  ALEC lists several criticisms of municipal broadband providers:  
"They erode consumer choice by making markets less attractive to competition 
because of the government’s expanded role as a service provider… cities and towns 
are signing up for these projects before comprehensively evaluating all the issues 
surrounding this type of initiative.  The fact that no “best practices” or standard 
business models have yet to emerge and many local governments have used taxpayer 
money to fund loosing ventures warrants the need for government officials and 
citizens to carefully weigh the advantages and disadvantages that exist."14 
1.5. Advocates for Community Involvement against Passage of HB 282 
Municipalities, particularly those with low population density or difficult terrain, argue that 
they have often found that private companies are not willing to invest in internet infrastructure 
for their residents because it is not likely to be cost effective.   The Free Press Action Fund policy 
director Matt Wood writes:  
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"Everyone is tired of waiting on incumbent providers to connect rural and low-income 
communities…municipal broadband can provide better service at lower prices, and the 
phone and cable giants should stop strong-arming state legislators to prevent local 
communities from making that choice for themselves."15 
Rural accessibility of broadband is a well-known problem. Approximately eighteen million 
Americans in remote or rural regions do not have access to reliable broadband internet due to 
several factors, including difficult terrain to install cables, high costs of infrastructure, and low 
demand, all of which lead to disincentives for private investment because rural expansion is not 
likely to be economically profitable.  Within rural areas, only 38% of the population has a 
broadband subscription, compared to an average of 57% in urban areas.
16
 The declining 
prevalence of manufacturing is having a negative impact on availability of jobs in many rural 
areas. To mitigate the negative impact of being left behind an increasingly digitally connected 
economy and risk not being able to effectively compete with more-connected areas, some 
governments have chosen to initiate investments in local broadband infrastructure.  
Not only communities, but also high tech companies benefit from moving into towns with 
high speed internet access regardless of the provider.  In their opposition to HB 282, several 
tech companies summarized their positions in a letter, signed by Alcatel-Lucent, Google, Atlantic 
Engineering, Gigabit Squared, OnTrac, FTTH Council, American Public Power Association, 
National Association of Telecommunications Officers and Advisors (NATOA), SouthEast 
Association of Telecommunications Officers and Advisors (SEATOA), Utilities Telecom Council, 
and the Telecommunications Industry Association
17
  by arguing the bill on the grounds that it 
would hurt economic growth, and impair educational opportunities. 
Since the threat of a digital divide, or the economic disadvantage for groups of people 
without adequate access to information through the internet, is potentially a serious setback for 
smaller communities, Councilman Chris Owens of Alpharetta, a city north of Atlanta, remarked: 
8 
 
“if that's something in a community's best interests, who is better to make that decision than a 
community rather than the state on behalf of the community."
18
 
1.6. Limitations in Other States 
Nineteen states, including North Carolina, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Louisiana, Nevada, 
North and South Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Texas have passed legislation that either prohibits 
municipal broadband or enhances barriers to government entry. These laws vary in scope, but 
some outright ban municipalities from building their own networks while others place 
restrictions to make it more challenging for them to so. Some of them ban utility companies 
from offering telecommunications services, put restrictions on the use of public funds, and 
mandates to remit the equivalent of corporate taxes, franchise fees, and Right-of-Way fees to 
the state government. Additionally, many of them include accounting separation requirements, 
public hearings, voter approval, and reporting requirements.   
The North Carolina example most directly influenced introduction of the community 
broadband bill in Georgia.  The North Carolina House Bill 129, passed in 2012, prevents local 
governments from establishing internet service outside city boundaries and the service provider 
has to remit to the state the same amount of money that a private company would have to pay 
in corporate income taxes, sales and use taxes, and franchise fees using only revenues from 
operations, not city funds. 
19
 Any municipality that is considering offering telecommunications 
services would be required to hold public hearings, separate the telecommunications unit from 
other utilities so they could not offer services below cost, and could not receive financing for 
buildout without public approval.
20
 One author elaborates on the bill’s effects:  
“The legislation does not expressly prohibit municipal broadband. Now, however, any 
city that wants to build its own network will have to abide by a complex series of rules. 
Those include remitting to the state the same amount that a private provider would 
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have to pay in corporate income, sales and use and franchise taxes (about $19 per 
customer) and using only revenues generated by the service to finance it, rather than 
other city funds. Municipalities will be required to charge customers the full amount 
that it costs them to operate the network and must limit coverage to the jurisdictional 
boundaries of the city. You could build the network but you could never operate it” 21 
The legislation effectively bans government entry into the market if they don’t already 
provide service, and prohibits existing providers from expanding outside municipal borders. 
Community leaders such as business owners, school administrators, and government officials 
from towns like Wilson, Salisbury (network named Fiberant) and Dawsonville-Mooresville 
(network named Mi-Connection), which had already adopted municipal broadband, testified to 
the state legislature about the benefits they have received from the networks.  Apparently the 
incumbent companies were not willing to invest in their cities, and after repeated attempts, city 
officials allocated funds for local broadband infrastructure. In the town of Wilson, Jeff Klein, the 
owner of BB&T invested into bonds to benefit from higher speeds. Don Oliver, a firefighter at 
the Wilson Fire Department, posited that his ability to protect the city and respond to fires has 
dramatically improved.  It also cut down costs:  Don said he is able to do training without 
scheduling off-duty time through video conferencing, able to contact citizens with important 
evacuation and shelter information quickly, and monitor buildings for rising temperature rates. 
Similarly, the Wilson Police Department also benefited from being able to deploy cameras in 
high-crime areas at a much cheaper rate with a faster information-gathering capacity, which 
would have been cost-prohibitive prior to the broadband.
22
 
The proponents of the bill criticized Mi-Connection because it was not making enough 
money for the investment.  In 2011-2012 Davidson as a city was paying $1.94 million every 
month on Mi-Connection’s $89.9 million debt, 21 percent of the town’s whole budget. The town 
people considered defaulting, but that would mean the towns would not be able to borrow 
again and interest rates would increase. The towns had agreed that their financial interest 
10 
 
would be based on each town’s subscribership percentage, which means the more successful 
the program in the city, the more financial responsibility that town carries. In July 2011, 
residents of Davidson had 35% subscribership and residents of Mooresville had 64%. The system 
has not yet turned a profit since 2007 at the time of the article’s publication in 2011. 
23
 
Groups that advocated for the bill included AT&T and Time Warner Cable, the two 
dominant private ISPs in the state, and community stakeholders were against the bill. An FCC 
report released in March showed that North Carolina ranked last in the nation in consumer 
access to minimum broadband speeds, with only 10 percent of households wired effectively. 
Where broadband does exist, the bandwidth is among the most expensive in the country; North 
Carolina is home to seven of the ten most expensive locations for bandwidth for small and 
midsize businesses.  FCC Commissioner Mignon Clyburn released a statement following the 
proposal of the bill admitting the while the FCC did not have the authority to block these 
restrictions, he encourages efforts to block such legislation because “local governments should 
not be restricted from building their own broadband networks [because it is] counterproductive 
and will impede the nation from accomplishing the [National Broadband] Plan’s goal of 
providing broadband access to every American and community anchor institution.” While the 
law still passed, the commissioner’s statement reflects that there is national attention paid to 
state efforts to restrict broadband.
24
  In fact, in 2007, Senator Lautenberg from New Jersey 
introduced the “Community Broadband Act” which would negate all state laws restricting 
municipal broadband by declaring state subdivisions as a protected entity to compete in the 





HISTORY OF PUBLIC UTILITY AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
REGULATION 
2.1. Public Utilities 
The term “public utility” lacks a precise definition, but it generally signifies a service subject 
to regulation of prices, quantity, and other considerations by public authorities.
25
  Utilities are 
not classified as typical industry and government services because they tend to operate more 
efficiently as monopolies, so they have obligations to serve the public with adequate service at a 
just and reasonable price.
26
   In the United States, most utilities are privately owned and 
publically regulated, but many are publicly owned as well.   
Tracing the history of utility regulation in the United States can help shed light on how 
broadband services can be considered as a public utility similar to that of electricity, gas, water, 
sewer, and other utilities that are known to be publicly provided in many areas of the country.  
The history of utility regulation can be separated into three phases.
27
   
2.1.1. Phase 1: Nineteenth Century Oversight 
The first phase took place in the last half of the nineteenth century, and was characterized 
by a great amount of risky investment into early transportation, electricity, and telephone 
infrastructure, which was mainly financed by coalitions of wealthy families and by 
entrepreneurs.  States created the first regulatory agencies for the railroad industry.  From 1870 
to 1920, state governments issued Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity to public 
service industries upon inquiry if there was a public need or interest to access new or expanded 
services in order to prevent wasteful duplication and ruinous competition among service 
12 
 
providers and common carriers in an area.
28
   The state, and decreasingly, the municipalities, 
issued franchises and rights of way, loosely regulated service quality and prices up to a certain 
extent, but rarely involved in direct financing.
 29
 These franchises were typically long-term, from 
twenty to fifty years.
30
  Researchers Kanazawa and Noll found that regulation during this period 
did not inhibit investment and resulted in lower prices.
31
 Telecommunications, like the gas, 
water, and electric industries were similarly limited in regulatory oversight during this period.
32
   
2.1.2. Phase 2: Twentieth Century Regulation 
The second wave of infrastructure development began at end of the nineteenth century 
until approximately the 1970s, in which the role of the state in infrastructure financing, 
management, ownership, and regulation, continuously grew.  Regulating businesses, particularly 
in relation to interstate commerce, was largely extended during the Progressive Era of the early 
20th century.
33
  This period was characterized by increasing municipal and state regulation and, 
by the 1940s, heavy federal regulation as well.
34
  “In 1902, only one state had an agency with 
the authority to regulate telephones, but by 1913, 39 states had such agencies.”
35
  Large 
corporations were beginning to thrive in an increasingly interconnected economy, which led to 
worker abuse and corruption grievances, and prompted increasing government intervention in 
business industries. Utility companies actually welcomed and lobbied for state regulation, 
believing state governments to be friendlier and less demanding than municipal governments.
36
 
State regulation was often aimed at encouraging or imposing interconnectivity between 
individual networks.
37
 Also, state policies were often directed at supporting lower socio-
economic communities through cross-subsidization with more profitable areas.
38
  Publicly-
owned utility systems began to emerge as alternatives to private providers in the early 1900s, 
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especially in smaller cities and towns where industry was slow to invest in service-provision, 
particularly in the electricity sector.
39
   
2.1.2.1. Telecommunications Sector 
After the expiration of the original AT&T patents in 1893-1894 on the new telephone 
technology, as many as 4000 independent companies sprang up in competition. Improvements 
in copper wire technology allowed companies to use smaller and cheaper wires, which 
promoted competition to such an extent that, by 1907, the independents gained control of as 
much as 50 percent of all telephones.
40
  However, many of these companies provided poor 
service and did not ensure interoperability with other phone services, and AT&T started to buy 
many of these independent companies in 1907, even buying a large share of Western Union in 
1909.
41
 In 1910, the invention of a three element vacuum tube that could be a means of 
wireless telephony prompted AT&T to buy the patent on the tube, as well as patents on any 
similar devices, because of fear that any such devices would threaten their wired network.
42
  
This behavior prompted an anti-trust investigation by the U.S. Justice Department that 
resulted in the 1913 Kingsbury Commitment, in which AT&T was allowed to buy independent 
companies which were in non-competitive environments, agreed to divest of its Western Union 
stock, and permitted other companies that met its equipment standards to join onto its system.  
As a result, “AT&T obtained the benefit of a de facto sanctioned monopoly without the quid pro 
quo of regulatory oversight”
43
 , and the Interstate Commerce Commission’s telecommunications 
department did little to regulate telephony until the establishment of the Federal 
Communications Commission in 1934.
44
 In 1925, AT&T committed itself to providing extensive 
network service within the U.S. by selling all of the company’s international holdings, except for 
in Canada. By 1932, competition greatly diminished and AT&T’s market share grew to 79 
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percent.  The Kingsbury Commitment was a big step toward the monopoly model that 
characterized the subsequent policies of the FCC.   
2.1.2.2. Natural Monopolies 
This type of a regulated monopoly approach to utility regulation, particularly of the 
telecommunications and electricity industries, during these years was significantly motivated by 
the economic theory of natural monopolies.
 45
  Networks, also referred to as “common callings” 
or “common carriers”, are commerce-facilitating resources that include currency, electricity, 
irrigation, transportation, and telecommunications.  Networks face a different set of challenges 
than many goods and services markets because, rather than each new customer yielding the 
same amount of profit, new customers added to a network yield greater profit at lower cost for 
each new member due to the diffusion of fixed costs and gains from scale.  Also, a natural 
monopoly has “an inherent tendency toward declining long-term costs; high threshold 
investment; and technological conditions that limit the number of potential entrants.”
46
 These 
aspects of networks is the reason why, in many cases, they are considered “natural 
monopolies”, industries in which integrated systems are most efficiently provided and organized 
by a single firm.
47
   
 In the telecommunications arena, natural monopoly is defined by an amendment to the 
Communications Act in 1943 as “one company adequately regulated can be expected to render 
a superior service at lower cost than that provided by competing companies.”
48
 A key difference 
in the development of this definition of a natural monopoly is its emphasis on “adequately 
regulated”, reflecting the increased emphasis on the necessity of a regulatory agency to 
safeguard monopolistic advantage.  As a result, it is considered in best public interest to 
establish a natural monopoly in networks to maintain consistent standards and operations for 
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the common good. Governments and public entities often have a large role in protecting 
networks. In the case of AT&T, the Federal Communication Commission (FCC), as well as its 
predecessors in the Department of Commerce, has protected the company from competition 
and incentivized network coverage expansion through a system of mandates and subsidies, 
including subsidizing local service through long distance to expand telephone infrastructure. 
2.1.2.3. Creation of the Federal Communications Commission  
The political climate and attitude toward big businesses changed during the economic 
hardships of the Great Depression.  The New Deal prompted a wave of regulations characterized 
by an effort to ensure smoothly functioning markets, maintain the stability of commercial 
entities, and protect basic social equity.  The agencies established during this period diverted 
power away from state agencies to federal jurisdiction of a particular type of industry through 
price-and-entry controls.  The Communications Act of 1934 established the Federal 
Communication Commission (FCC) to replace the Federal Radio Commission and 
telecommunication jurisdictions of the Department of Commerce.  The FCC was put in charge of 
regulating telecommunications such as telephony and broadcasting, allocating the frequency 
spectrum, and establishing licenses.  
In its cartel management role, the FCC’s primary policy tool was to protect the natural 
monopoly of AT&T through price and entry regulation.  FCC limited new entrants into the 
market, which facilitated AT&T to use cross-subsidies by making profit from long distance 
service to subsidized local network rates and to expand service.
49
 Value-for-service pricing 
meant that users, who valued the service more, were willing to pay more, so they were charged 
more.  Practically, this meant that urban residents paid more than rural residents and 
businesses paid more than residential users.
50
 Price caps and bundling also served as methods 
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of regulating monopoly service. These encourage demand in the market while subsidizing 
certain costs.  
However, one authority writes “the FCC never had the ability or the means to effectively 
monitor AT&T’s rates and charges [and] consistently deferred to AT&T’s judgment.”
51
 AT&T 
could charge arbitrary license contact fees to local operating companies for using AT&T central 
organization, as well as for telephony technology. For example, the justice department filed an 
anti-trust suit against Western Electric in 1949 because they could not ascertain the 
reasonableness of their equipment charges.
52
 One tool was to limit the jurisdiction of AT&T. 
Similar to AT&T’s exit from the telegraph industry, AT&T was not allowed to enter the satellite 
market so it did not monopolize entry by other firms on account of its vast resources and 
advantage. It was also not allowed to enter the television market. One of these antitrust 
concerns previously resulted in the “1956 confinement of AT&T in the provision of regulated 
common carrier telecommunications only.”
53
 According to one expert, the ideological shift that 
led to deregulation was owed to two factors: one, the anti-trust problems mentioned above, 
and two, the needs of large telecommunication users, such as businesses.
54
  
2.1.3. Phase 3: Late Twentieth Century Deregulation 
Broad social events such as the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s served to promote the 
rise of many grassroots organizations that fought for social justice and attacked high profile 
institutions and corporations. During the Great Society Era of 1965-1977 people were concerned 
with externalities, particularly environmental externalities, the power of big business, and 
concern for consumer values. The new agencies that were established during this era attempted 
to regulate all industries, rather than specific ones as that were established in the New Deal. 
Apparently, “twenty of the nation’s 55 major regulatory agencies were established between 
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1967 and 1973.”  These included the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), inspired by Rachel 
Carson’s Silent Spring, and the Occupational Safety and Hazard Administration (OSHA). Many 
people, especially in the 60s, believed that a powerful government should act to curb the 
unbounded interests of the corporations.   
By the 1970s, ideology toward regulation began to change as the needs of extending the 
network became less of a priority than promoting technological competence and effectiveness 
within the network.  The need for regulation initially arose primarily to ensure universality for 
the sake of public interest; there were too many players entering the field, which threatened 
comprehensive standard setting for the sake of efficiency. With developments in technology and 
ideology, public interest shifted from desiring universality of service to price competition and 
efficiency.  
The third wave of utility regulation, which started around the 1970s, was characterized by 
rapid technological improvements and by increased investment into infrastructure, more 
commonly from public utility organizations, but also from large corporations.
55
  For example, in 
the1960s and 1970s, a newer cable television infrastructure, like transportation and electricity 
networks before it, was being built by private providers primarily in urban areas, and many 
communities began investing into their own cable networks.  They viewed the possibilities of 
local and national information broadcasting as important investments in the future of their 
economic development and quality of life. 
56
  These changes led to a criticism that existing 
regulation was restrictive, irrelevant, and maladjusted,
57
 which called for a deregulation policy 
paradigm with greater regulatory flexibility.
58
  One expert writes: “economic factors, particularly 
the inflation and productivity decline of the 1970s [caused] prices of regulated services to rise”; 





 To promote competition, between 1976 and 1989, legislation was passed to 
deregulate railroad transportation, airlines, natural gas, public busses, and 
telecommunications.
60
 Deregulation and privatization of utilities led to a regulatory 
environment similar to how it happened in the first phase of utility regulation with a return to 
and increased role of market forces.
61
   In fact, the deregulation movement actually resulted in a 
divergence of myriad independent regulatory agencies similar to that of the late nineteenth 
century.
62
  Interestingly, while most of the twentieth century was characterized by a relative 
consensus on natural monopolies as an economic motivator for government action, economic 
opinions of the deregulatory period had been more divergent on their view of how competition 
influences utilities and to which extent government intrusion could contribute to addressing 
inadequate service provision problems.
63
  
2.1.3.1. Buildup to Deregulation of the Telecommunications Industry 
Improvements in technology during World War II also gradually began to threaten AT&T 
monopoly.   Starting in the late 1950s, the FCC began to allow a small amount of competition in 
telephony business services.
64
 Improvements in satellite technology established Comsat as a 
legitimate competitor to AT&T. FCC moved to limit the right of AT&T to get satellites because of 
anti-trust concerns, which showed that competition was possible.  Also, microwave-based 
communications technology improved during the 1960s and new equipment prompted the 
growth of new companies, particularly MCI as the first significant competitor to AT&T. MCI, or 
Microwave Communications, Inc. was granted a market for private lines in 1969. In response, 
AT&T tried to argue that the proliferation of private lines could jeopardize national security in 
order to maintain its hegemonic control of the industry.
65
  The needs of the market were 
showing symptoms that competition was possible, but the regulatory structure was not flexible.  
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Retail manufacturing companies also realized they would benefit from AT&T deregulation. 
Many small companies wanted to be allowed into the telephone business, they argued that 
regulation restrictions were diminishing technological innovation.66 Radio equipment companies 
wanted to break into the telecommunications market with newly developed microwave 
technology.  Businesses needed a way to transfer a large amount of business data, which was 
poorly served by the small bandwidth of AT&T phone lines.67 Until 1976, the industry saw a 
growing integration of telephones with computers.68 This development enhanced 
telecommunication services with value-added and information services as a result of integration 
of data processing resources.69  
At this point, FCC regulations began to hurt technological improvements in the network 
more than they helped. For example, the Hush-a-Phone was invented to improve on the noise 
surrounding a user’s voice, but AT&T pressured the FCC to limit this competing product. This 
case demonstrated that AT&T was limiting technological innovation with its monopolistic 
influence. The AT&T pricing system came further under attack as economic conditions 
worsened.  There were also criticisms that AT&T was setting arbitrary prices on services, 
installation technology, and employee salaries.  By the 1970s, long distance paid “an increasingly 
higher percentage of local telephone plant costs.70 After World War 2, the FCC pushed small 
portions of the Bell Company to competition, notably in establishing private lines between two 
points and diversification of terminal equipment.  Many larger companies sought to cut down 
costs by investing in these private lines in telecommunication or charter airlines in transport to 
escape regulatory lag. By the mid-1970s, competition had advanced to challenge long-distance 
service provision of AT&T. Further emerging competition had an incentive to follow the 
standards of the mainstream companies. In effect, furthering the network, rather than creating 
a new one, so regulation of standards became less of a necessity.  
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Ostensibly, both sides of the political spectrum supported deregulation.  Economists 
argued that regulation was anti-business and populists argued that regulation has resulted in 
regulatory lag and agency capture.  The FCC generally practiced politics of bargaining, 
negotiation, and rate setting directly with AT&T.  This tool became less effective as the FCC 
gained jurisdiction over new technological industries, and resulted in a regulatory lag which 
greatly slowed proceedings.  In 1974, the Justice Department filed another anti-trust suit against 
AT&T for predatory pricing, and Congress moved in 1976 to begin rewriting the original 
Communications Act. Until deregulation, the dominant theory was that capitalists would pursue 
individual short-term profits without necessarily adequately growing and safeguarding the 
overall industry. However, the growth of technology, the inadequacy of AT&T in providing all 
services, and broad political trends weakened the popularity of this theory and political interests 
moved toward deregulation. 
2.1.3.2. Deregulation of the Telecommunications Industry 
In the 1980s, AT&T, or “Ma Bell,” was broken up into several Regional Bell Operating 
Companies (RBOCs), or “Baby Bells,” to promote competition within the telephone industry.  In 
the next decade, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 deregulated the telephone industry and 
allowed companies to unbundle lines for lease or wholesale from the RBOCs, in the hopes that 
other companies can lease non-replicable portions of the network and build their own 
infrastructure, which would stimulate competition over time. In practice, however, the FCC has 
taken actions that have ended many of these unbundling obligations.71 Furthermore, the 
unbundling of copper telephone lines has been shown to have a negative effect on the 
deployment of Next Generation Fiber-to-the-Home (FTTH) infrastructure, ostensibly because 
providers could use existing copper infrastructure instead of investing into fiber.72   
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The act defined the RBOC providing telephone service in the region as the Incumbent Local 
Exchange Carrier (ILEC), and any other telephone company in the region as a Competitive Local 
Exchange Carrier (CLEC).  The act also established the Universal Service Fund (USF), which 
charged a fee to the consumer to build out telephone infrastructure in rural areas. Because 
most broadband infrastructure uses some the existing copper lines of the ILECs to deliver 
internet service to the home, most municipal broadband networks in Georgia have applied to be 
designated as a CLEC. 
While the act dictated that “prohibiting the ability of any entity to provide any interstate of 
intrastate telecommunications service” may seem to apply to municipalities, the Supreme 
Court, in a case resulting from municipalities in Missouri challenging the state law placing 
restrictions on their ownership of broadband networks, ruled that “entity” does not specifically 




2.2. Telecommunications in Georgia 
In 1995, Georgia legislature passed the Telecommunications and Competition Development 
Act which changed how Georgia’s Public Service Commission (PSC) managers and regulates 
telecommunications in the state. The bill gave PSC the authority to manage and facilitate 
telecommunications companies into competitive markets, mediate disputes, and monitor access 
to services, rates, and quality. The law also made it possible for municipal corporations to 
provide communications services.74 As a result of state court litigation dealing with the city of 
Marietta, it is common practice in Georgia for municipal internet service or cable TV providers to 
register as CLECs, even if they are not competing in phone service.75  This designation seems to 
help cities purchase telephone pole attachments from ILECs for internet infrastructure.76  
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Georgia has 223 CLECs and 34 telephone companies, 30 of which are investor-owned, and four 
are non-profit cooperatives with subscriber membership bases.77   
Georgia’s history in cable TV competition has influenced it’s broadband policies.  In the 
1960s and 1970s, many municipalities began to build their own cable TV infrastructure when 
private providers were too slow to invest in the areas.  Since Georgia has a strong cable industry 
organization, the Cable Television Association of Georgia (CTAG), it fought to limit municipal 
competition by imposing restrictions on municipalities that have applied to the Public Service 
Commission. As a result, a number of requirements have been placed to prevent local 
telecommunications cross subsidization.78 The requirements state that Georgia 
telecommunications providers pay a franchise fee of approximately 5%, as well as pole 
attachment fees to the city or the county. 
2.2.1. Georgia Public Web 
The Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia (MEAG), a coordinating body for public electric 
plants of 54 cities, and has a historically important role in the development of the state’s 
municipal telecommunications utilities. MEAG attempted to take advantage of the new law and 
provide telecommunications service, but lost the litigation on the grounds that as a statewide 
organization, not a municipal corporation.  The members of MEAG then created Georgia Public 
Web (GPW) as a nonprofit.  GPW is a CLEC that owns a 3000 mile statewide fiber optic network 
and provides services such as IT support, and internet, private line, and web solutions to its 
member organization.   GPW is owned by 32 Georgia municipalities including the City of Albany, 
City of Cairo, City of Calhoun, City of Camilla, City of Cartersville, City of Covington, City of 
Elberton, City of Fairburn, City of Forsyth, City of Fort Valley and Fort Valley Utility Commission, 
Marietta FiberNet, City of Moultrie, City of Newnan and the Newnan Water Light & Sewage 
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Commission, City of Sandersville, City of Thomasville (for full list of member cities, please see 
Appendix B). 79  GPW is primarily designed to provide fiber optic capacity for the cities’ electric 
plant SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) industrial control systems. Out of the 
32, at least 11, likely 16, of the members built some local fiber for other purposes including 
connecting municipal institutions and selling excess capacity to businesses.  
2.3 Conclusions from History of Utility and Telecommunications Regulation 
 The history of utility regulation and its role in telecommunications reveals that broadband 
can be viewed as a utility, subject to regulation and public obligations as any other public or 
privately-owned utility. The rate-of-return type regulation resulting from the theory of natural 
monopolies has resulted in the establishment of Federal and State regulatory commissions 
which have extensive roles in ensuring that public utilities, including the telecommunications 
sector are fair to their customers on price and quality. In Georgia, this effort has resulted in 
multiple models of public participation in the telecommunications sector, including the 
formation of statewide organizations in an effort to ensure access to electricity and 
telecommunications to areas not adequately served by private providers. The entry of 
municipalities into broadband provision similarly follows a long history of government 
intervention in utility provision.  Municipal involvement in utilities can be traced from the 
provision of electricity, to water, sewer, waste, natural gas, cable TV, and finally broadband 
internet in an effort to benefit the community with the latest technologies which enable them 
to participate in the national economy on a competitive level.  The case studies of Georgia 
municipal networks will further illuminate the role that public provision of utilities plays in local 
government decisions to enter the telecommunications market and build public wireline 




ECONOMIC IDEOLOGY AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES 
3.1. Economic Perspectives on Competition 
 Robert Atkinson presents a comprehensive paradigm of four competing economic 
doctrines, each with a different view on competition and the appropriate role for government 
policy.  These four doctrines: conservative neoclassical, liberal neoclassical, neo-Keynesian, and 
innovation economics guide the perspectives of decision makers on whether certain policy 
prescriptions toward broadband deployment are correct or misguided.
80
  
Conservative Neoclassical economists believe that markets seek optimal equilibrium due 
to aggregated decisions of rational actors, and the most efficient allocation of resources results 
from pursuing equality between marginal costs and price.   Subscribers of this viewpoint are 
generally less likely to view markets as prone to failure and are thus more critical of government 
policy because they believe it distorts the market and prevents the most effective allocation of 
goods and services.
 81
   In broadband markets, conservative neoclassicists believe that, even 
though broadband markets are not purely competitive, they have strong incentives to behave as 
if they are in competitive markets. They believe different technologies: such as fiber, DSL, cable, 
wireless, and satellite are sufficient economic substitutes, and regulation would be harmful to 
broadband markets reduce efficient allocation of broadband resources.
82
  Most of the 
proponents for restricting municipal broadband are subscribers to this view of market 
competition and that entry by municipalities distorts the local broadband market. 
Liberal neoclassicists are also concerned with efficient allocation, but they are much 
more concerned about the concept of fairness. They believe that government intervention is 
justified to promote fairness, even if it harms efficiency.  In the broadband markets, liberal 
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neoclassicists believe because networks lack effective competition, markets are dominated by 
monopolistic pricing, deadweight loss, and unnecessarily high prices for consumers.
83
 Thus, 
government action and municipal entry into broadband provision is justified in encouraging 
competition and bringing fairness to the market.  
Neo-Keynesian economists believe that investment, government spending, and 
economic stimulus is almost always positive for economic growth because more equitable 
distributions of income lead to more consumption and ensure high levels of aggregate demand 
essential for sustaining a market-based economy.
84
 Similarly to Liberal neoclassicists, neo-
Keynesians see the predominant monopoly and duopoly markets as having excess profits and 
high prices, and justify government-owned provision and subsidies as important tools for 
increasing consumer choice and broadband service quality.  
Innovation economics is a newer economics doctrine primarily motivated by 
management and public policy fields.  It postulates that innovation increases productive and 
adaptive efficiency which drive economic growth, expand wealth, and improve quality of life in 
the long run. Government can serve as an economic actor that can take steps to be productive 
and innovative because gains from productivity in the long-run will outweigh any short term 
costs and losses.
85
  For example, proponents of this view do not support unbundling, as was 
done in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, because, as stated earlier, research proves that 
access to older technology creates disincentives for investing into newer technology.   Generally, 
any actor, including municipal government, which wishes to enter into the market with an 
innovative technology, such as gigabit-capable fiber, will promote economic well-being.     
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3.1.1. The Role of Economic Perspectives in the Municipal Broadband Debate 
The debate in Georgia over municipal broadband is divided between conservative 
neoclassical economists, who are less likely to justify municipal entrance into 
telecommunications service as a response to a market failure, and liberal neoclassicists and neo-
Keynesians are more likely to view inadequate service as a market failure because demand is 
not sufficiently met.   Conservative neoclassicists and critics of municipal broadband say that 
public entrance crowds out competition are ideologically motivated by a version of free-market 
principles characterized by viewing government participation in the economy as harmful 
intrusion.  
It is clear that the opposing sides subscribe to different economic doctrines of competition 
and justification for government entrance. However, municipal entrance has to do with other 
factors as well.  The innovation economics perspective relates closely to the concept of non-
market failure, which posits that factors outside of market failure can motivate government 
action as much as market failure, including internalities of the level of efficiency of the local 
government itself, the community perception and level of approval of action taken by the local 
government, and value systems associated with technological advance.  Charles Wolf, an early 
proponent of this view, points out that “non-market agencies…may establish advanced 
technology or technical ‘quality’ as a goal to be sought in agency operations and performance.  
In medicine, a bias toward ‘Cadillac’ quality health care, and in the military a sometimes 
compulsive tendency toward development and procurement of the ‘next generation’ of more 
sophisticated equipment, may result.”
86
 This viewpoint reflects the priority that municipalities 




3.2. Reasons for Government-Entry into Internet Service Provision 
Government entry into communication services may be justified economically in three ways: 
(1) as a response to a market failure; (2) as a way to opportunistically take advantage of scale or 
scope economies afforded by investments or services that were put in place for another reason; 
87 or (3) to realize positive externalities.   
3.2.1. As a Response to Market Failure 
 
Figure 1: Monopoly 
 
Natural monopolies have a profit incentive to charge higher prices than in a competitive 
environment where price equals marginal cost.   Market failure “encompasses a situation 
where, in any given market, the quantity of a product demanded by consumers does not equate 
to the quantity supplied by suppliers.”
88
 This is a direct result of a lack of certain economically 
ideal factors, which prevents equilibrium.  A region may not have any internet providers 
because the population density does not justify investments or upgrades by a private 
company.
89
  Also, if a community has one internet provider, the company can charge 
monopolistic rates to its residents.  The majority of municipal governments enter into service 
provision because their community is unserved or underserved.  
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3.2.2. Opportunistic Entry and Sunk Costs 
 
Figure 2: Sunk Costs 
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Another reason for government entry, called “opportunistic entry” is when the 
government has already invested sunk costs into doing another communications-related activity 
and further entry into services can benefit their operations or they can take advantage of scale 
and scope so the cost of additional investment is relatively low.  By aggregating the risks and 
costs of building the infrastructure, the provider disperses vulnerability of demand fluctuations 
in any section of the customer base. 
91
  
Network effects, also known as Metcalfe’s law, is a notable concept related to this 
natural monopolies. The benefit of the network grows for every user as members are added to 
the network, whereas the costs are incrementally lower, at some point close to zero.  Thus, 
adding broadband services and users to the network is a marginal step, but yield a high return 
because of the infrastructure they already leverage against the network.  
Economies of scale and scope characterize the aggregate effects of networks.  
Economies of scale “exist when a firm’s average cost curve decreases as output increases.” 
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This includes decreasing costs in the short-run and long run because the cost of adding an 
additional unit of capacity declines as the coverage increases. Economies of scope “are said to 
exist if a given quantity of each of the two or more goods can be produced by one firm at a 
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lower total cost than if each good were produced separately by different firms.”
93
 This effect is 
prevalent in the telecommunications sector because infrastructure such as local exchange 
switchboards, large scale plants, the connections for wires  
For example, a municipality may have installed a backbone fiber network to provide 
data communication services into government buildings and anchor institutions such as local 
schools, hospitals, and libraries. As Information Technology (IT) becomes more important in 
business operations for both private and public enterprises and with increased government 
efficiency and open access, local governments have been increasing their investments in IT as 
part of their normal operations.
94
  Municipal electric utilities are an important consumer of 
energy and require an internal communications infrastructure as well as other anchor 
institutions such as schools, hospitals, and government facilities.  
3.2.3. Positive externalities 
If a company does not see that it will be profitable to invest in a region, the local people 
often find themselves at an economic disadvantage; in internet service terms, the problem is 
often referred to as the “digital divide”.  Businesses are more likely to move to and hire workers 
in areas with greater internet connectivity and faster connection speeds, a more educated 
workforce, and a better utility base to support their business processes.
95
  Robert Crandall, 
William Lehr, and Robert Litan summarize some research on broadband benefits to economic 
development:   
• “Employment in several industries is positively associated with broadband use. 
More specifically, for every one percentage point increase in broadband 
penetration in a state, employment is projected to increase by 0.2 to 0.3 percent 
per year 
• Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2007) report that ICT contributed 59 percent of the 
growth in labor productivity from 1995 to 2000 and 33 percent from 2000 to 2005. 
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• Yildmaz and Dinc (2002) find telecommunications infrastructure promotes 
productivity growth in service sectors, based on a state-level study of the United 
States. Greenstein and Spiller (1995) similarly find that investments in advanced 
telecommunications infrastructure helps explain growth in consumer surplus and 
business revenue. 
• Lehr, Gillett, Sirbu, and Osorio (2005) estimated that communities with broadband 
experienced faster job and firm growth, and realized higher rental rates than non-
broadband”96 
If the private sector does not provide an adequate network, communities have an 
incentive to directly promote the development of a reliable and affordable broadband 
network to actualize positive externalities such as economic development, skilled workers, 
better schools, and greater democratic participation.   
Community anchor institutions such as schools, libraries, government facilities, and police 
and fire service can benefit from faster internet in promoting public goods such as education, 
emergency responsiveness, community outreach, and access to free internet hot-spots.  The 
presence of faster internet can also give the residents the ability to cut down on other costs, 
such as phone bills through Voice over IP (VoIP), traveling costs through telecommuting, and 
training costs through teleconferencing.  Schools can benefit by downloading educational 
content, government facilities can cut down on administrative costs, and fire and police 
protection services can monitor the community and respond faster to crimes and emergencies.  
3.3. Ownership Models for Broadband 
The specifics of how a broadband network may be funded, maintained, and operated can 
vary depending on the unique geographic, political, and market-specific characteristics of the 
service area.  Investment into broadband infrastructure and operational service to the 
subscriber base can be provided in a spectrum of options.  The reason that there is such a wide 
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variety of service provision models is because municipalities can have different roles in building 
the network, as well as in providing services.   
Municipalities can serve as a facilitator, sponsor, coordinator, or developer of broadband 
infrastructure.
97
 In the role of facilitator, the municipality facilitates construction, handles the 
rights of way, and the private provider deploys the network, parts of which they may own. The 
sponsor role involves facilitating and coordinating nonprofits to build the network and the 
infrastructure may be owned by public or private entities. In the role of coordinator, the 
municipality invests in the partnership, but the main role is to plan the network and develop the 
roadmaps, maintains ownership of the network, while outsourcing operations to the private 
sector.  Finally, in the developer role, the municipality builds, owns, operates, and maintains the 
network as a utility, most commonly in partnership with the local electric utility.  
Similarly, the municipality has several options of how to conduct operations of the network, 
including as a contractor, wholesaler, and retailer of services.
98
  As a contractor, the municipality 
can contract operations to private parties and regulate its prices and service quality. As a 
wholesaler, the municipality forms a separate company and delivers open-access provision of 
network capacity for purchase. Lastly, as a retailer, the municipality provides access and services 




Figure 3: Models of Government Ownership 
3.3.1. Private Service Providers 
Privately-owned telecommunications providers, also called investor-owned utilities, can be 
relatively small and local, or large incorporated service providers accountable to shareholders.  
Research has found that private providers are more willing to invest in urban centers with high 
demand, despite the presence of greater competition
99
 (for a list of private Internet Service 
Providers in Georgia, please see Appendix A). 
3.3.2. Government- Operated Networks/ Municipal Broadband 
Government-Operated Networks typically involve direct investment in internet 
infrastructure as well as local operations.  Often operations are designated to the local electric 
utility company because it already has the capacity to deliver services to the local customer base 
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(for a list of municipal Internet Service Providers in Georgia, please see Appendices D and E, as 
well as Figure 7). 
3.3.4. Federal Stimulus 
In 2009, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), also known as The Stimulus, 
allocated 7.2 million dollars to the Broadband Technologies Opportunities Program (BTOP) (for a 
list of BTOP projects in Georgia, please see Appendix G).  The money was split with National 
Information and Telecommunications Administration (NTIA) receiving 4.7 million dollars and the 
Rural Utilities Service (RUS) 2.5 million. The North Georgia Network, facilitated by cooperatives, 
was the first project in Georgia and nationwide to apply for stimulus funds and finish buildout of 
the project.  Many of these programs are not aimed at such local development projects; rather 
they seek to promote interconnectivity, education, or another goal. This program has received 
criticism, such as the study by Navigant Economics that says at least three stimulus programs 




3.3.5. Public Private Partnerships  
Public-Private Partnerships can be formed through several methods of financial or 
regulatory incentives for private companies to build a new or a better network.  These 
incentives may include offering subsidies, decreasing or eliminating taxes and fees, issuing 
bonds to offset the company’s investment costs, or offering free utilities such as electricity. 
There are many types of public-private partnerships, and they can be uniquely tailored to a 




 Cooperatives are member based organizations working together for the common 
purpose of providing services. Georgia law states that cooperatives may not serve outside of 
their region “to other persons not in excess of 10 percent of the number of its members [and] 
that a cooperative which acquires existing telephone facilities in rural areas may continue 
service to persons, not in excess of 40 percent of the number of its members.
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 Also, the name 
of the cooperative have to include the words "Telephone" and "Cooperative," and the 
abbreviation "Inc." unless requested and approved by the Public Service Commission. 
3.3.7. Wholesale Model 
 In the wholesale services model, the municipality owns and operates a local access 
network, which provides a wholesale access platform for retail ISPs and other communication 
service providers to use. This may be a complete Metropolitan Area Network (MAN), a 





 Municipal provision of the wholesale model is not common because it is expected to 
maintain a high level of service quality, extensive advertising, and reliability on the success of 
those retail providers to which it sells capacity.  It can quickly become more rational to begin 
Figure 4: Wholesale Models 
(1) retail service model The municipality offers retail services to consumers over 
infrastructure that it owns and operates 
(2) franchise model The municipality contracts with a private firm to build and operate 
the facilities. 
(3) real estate model The municipality provides access to conduit or public rights-of-way 
(4) coordination model The municipality coordinates with other local areas to sell them 




providing retail services to build subscriber counts to target levels.  Thus, a pure wholesale 
model can be considered as risky, and some level of retail provision dilutes the risk.103 
3.3.8. Federal Subsidies 
The market failure of rural broadband investment is reminiscent of the electricity or 
telephony networks in the past century.  The Rural Electrification Administration and the Rural 
Utilities Service similarly allocated funds for electrifying the countryside as the Federal 
Communications Commission has been doing for telephone networks through the Universal 
Service Fund (USF).  As broadband connectivity is replacing telephone accessibility as a priority 
for the communications sector, the FCC is in the process of replacing the Universal Access Fund, 
which it previously used to expand telephone lines, with a Connect America Fund to expand 
broadband into rural areas.  This fund includes approximately $4.5 billion a year impacting an 
estimated 7 million rural Americans, potentially generating $50 billion in economic growth and 
adding half a million jobs.
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3.4. Broadband Technology 
3.4.1. Definition of Broadband 
   The National Broadband Plan defines broadband access as anything below 768 kbps is 
“unserved”, and anything between unserved and 3 Mbps is “underserved”.  Cable and DSL are 
the most prominent technologies for broadband in Georgia and the United States because they 







The National Telecommunications and Information Administration organizes broadband 
technology into categories of: Asymetric DSL, Symmetric DSL, Other Copper Wire, Cable 
Modem- DOCSIS 3.0, Cable Model-Other, Optical Fiber to the end user, Satellite, Terrestrial 
fixed- unlicensed, Terrestrial fixed- licensed, and Terrestrial mobile wireless 
3.4.2.1. Copper and DSL 
 
Figure 5: DSL and Copper in Georgia (NTIA July 2012) 
Copper wireline infrastructure is prominent in cities like Atlanta, Chicago, and Kansas City.  Most 
communities which have the copper phone line infrastructure already have DSL service. 
Asymmetric DSL refers to when download and upload speeds are not equal as they are in 
Symmetric DSL. Costas Troulos and Vasilis Maglaris find that private providers are more likely to 
utilize their existing copper infrastructure than invest in fiber for Next Generation Networks; this 
finding may signify that the expansive copper infrastructure around the Atlanta metropolitan 







Figure 6: Cable Infrastructure in Georgia (NTIA July 2012) 
While AT&T and Verizon were preoccupied with their respective U-verse and FIOS 
rollouts, cable operators were busy marketing their DOCSIS 3.0 based services with high speeds 
and bundles. DOCSIS 3.0 as well as other technology advances have enabled companies to 
greatly increase the speeds transmitted over existing cable lines.  A common type of cable is 





Figure 7: Fiber Infrastructure in Georgia (NTIA July 2012) 
Choosing fiber networks can provide certain advantages because this advanced 
broadband technology is not likely to be outdated.  It is more reliable, suffers from fewer 
disruptions, and can be incorporated into other organizations. Municipal providers have been 
many of the early adopters of fiber-to-the-home broadband, providing early insight into how 
these technologies perform in practice.
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 Much of the backbone and many middle-mile lines 
that transfer data between cities are made of optical fiber.  The cost of fiber is actually 
decreasing as the cost of cable and copper is increasing, so most new greenfield developments 
and neighborhoods choose to invest into fiber as the first option. A commonly mentioned type 
of wires is Broadband Passive Optical Network, which has a Radio Frequency (RF) overlay which 
can provide triple-play internet, TV, and telephone service. Gigabit Passive Optical Network is a 
more recent technology capable of higher speeds. .. As it can be seen on the map, municipalities 
have been a significant driver of fiber deployment. As of May 2004, municipalities served a third 





3.4.2.4. Wireless  
Wireless is a cheaper broadband option because it eliminates the cost of digging up the 
ground to lay down wires to the end user, especially in areas of rugged terrain and low 
population density. However, it is not as fast as wireline broadband and is often subject to data 
caps, which prevent many bandwidth intensive applications.  It also suffers from regulatory 
problems in allocating spectrum and cannot pass through some geographical or physical 
barriers.  
Licensed wireless is allocated to a regional provider following an auction. Unlicensed 
spectrum is located between allocated licensed spectrum; it is sometimes called “white space” 
or the “buffer zone” and is often used for household WiFi, Bluetooth, or other short-distance 
communications. The FCC is currently going through the process of reallocating spectrum, 
especially unused broadcast TV spectrum much of which is considered prime spectrum that can 
pass through significant physical barriers.  
Wireless technologies, and especially the potential for edge-based/customer-provided 
infrastructure via mesh networking, raise new opportunities for municipalities to help 
coordinate community networking efforts.
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 Mesh-networks are formed when electronic 
devices function as routers to other electronic devices, effectively building a wireless net with 
each node having many connections even when one is severed.  Mesh networks are more 
reliable because they are connected to all of the closest conductors of signal, which is any 
electronic device ranging from cell phone, computer, or other signal-emitting electronic devices.  
The municipality of Kennesaw, GA provides a free wireless mesh-network in some of its parks. 
However, these types of networks may be less secure by virtue of expanding access points to 
any device, and are often illegal in many regions of the country. It has been argued that 
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companies lobby the government to retain limitations on wireless mesh because they 
undermine a private company’s ability to monopolize the service along its lines and deter their 
expansion of land infrastructure. 
3.4.2.5. Satellite 
Satellite coverage has been improving and it is often the only option for very sparse, 
rural areas. However, each transmission has to travel satellites in space which creates a serious 
lag in loading time, and intensive caps on data usage. This technology is not a good option for 
economic development, but it is a good option of last resort because it is typically available for 




RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA COLLECTION 
4.1. Research Objective 
Georgia has a number of economic models for public investment in local wireline broadband 
infrastructure, including government-owned networks providing service to anchor institutions, 
businesses, and residents; networks providing services to just anchor institutions and 
businesses; and networks subsidized by federal grants.   The previous chapters provide a 
historical and economic background of how these networks may be viewed as public utilities 
and justify government entry into service provision.   The next chapters will present data 
gathered from actual stakeholders within Georgia and explain their perspective on government 
entry into municipal broadband infrastructure.  Their perspectives help illuminate the validity of 
the arguments against municipal broadband that it crowds out competition, provides poor 
quality of service, and lacks a comprehensive business model or best practices. 
4.2. Method Selection 
The most appropriate research method to answer these questions is case study research 
through publicly available information sources and interviews with local telecommunications 
and economic development officials.   Each community has unique situational factors which 
distinguish it from other localities; any and all of those characteristics may contribute to the 
municipality’s inclination toward providing broadband.  Interviews with local officials yield the 
most comprehensive and useful information in portraying the practical decision making process 
and incentive structure for market entry in the community.  Most of this useful information is 
not available through any other method, including research or open sources.   
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4.3. Data Collection 
The first step is to identify municipal networks in Georgia. There are three primary sources 
that collect data on ISPs around the country: NTIA National Broadband Map110, Broadband 
Communities Magazine111, and the Institute for Local Self Reliance112.   Also, municipal internet 
service providers register as CLECs.  Some members of Georgia Public Web have invested into 
broadband infrastructure as well. If any cities are not addressed, it is because they are not 
mentioned in any of those five sources.  
 The networks identified through these sources are: 
Type of Network Provider (Underlined if a selected case study) 
Municipal Networks to Georgia 
Residents  
- City of Elberton 
- City of Monroe 
- CNS: Cities of Thomasville, Cairo, Moultrie, and 
Camilla 
- City of Dalton 
- Fort Valley Utility Commission 
Municipal networks providing to 
anchor institutions and to some 
businesses 
- City of Dublin 
- City of Cartersville 
- City of LaGrange 
- City of Albany 
- City of Calhoun 
- City of Sandersville 
Broadband Technology Opportunities 
Program (BTOP) local infrastructure 
development projects.  
- North Georgia Network Cooperative, Inc. 
- Appalachian Valley Fiber Network 
- Columbia County Community Broadband Network 
 
Figure 8: Municipal Networks in Georgia 
Additionally, the cities of Covington, Fairburn, Forsyth, Griffin, Newnan are members of 
Georgia Public Web that are also registered as CLECs, so while they own some broadband 
infrastructure, not enough information is available about them without talking to local officials 
to clarify their customer base and level of service provision for the purposes of this paper. The 
city of Tifton, though listed in Broadband Communities Magazine, ILSR, and is a registered CLEC, 
has sold its network.  One CLEC registered in Georgia, the city of Carrollton, was not mentioned 
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by the three primary sources as a provider, and not a member of Georgia Public Web. This 
outlier was explained by a short call to the city of Carrollton, one of those officials explained to 
me that a few years ago, in the early days of fiber, the town hastily built a small fiber optic 
network to compete with the ISP, Charter, but was not maintained and quickly fell out of use.  
Six case studies, at least one in each of the three categories of provision (service to 
residents, to anchor institutions and businesses, and local infrastructure stimulus projects) were 
conducted with informational interviews with the local authority in charge of the network.  The 
case studies represent the cities that were responsive to the request for information and they 
provide a comprehensive portrayal of each category of broadband service provision.  
4.3.1. List of Interviews  
Name Expertise Position 




MonroeAccess Director of Electric and Telecommunications in 
Monroe 




North Georgia Network Board Member of the North Georgia Network and 
President of Connect North Georgia 
Guy Mullis DubLink IT Director for the City of Dublin 
Lamar 
Greeson 





source for community 
broadband developments. 113 
Director, Telecommunications as Commons 
Initiative, Institute for Local Self-Reliance (ILSR) 
Brian Adkins Private-Sector Broadband 
Provision 






Coauthor of “Municipal & Utility Guidebook to 
Bringing Broadband Fiber Optics to Your 
Community” 
Jim Baller Telecommunications Law President of the Baller Herbst Law Group, a 
national law firm dealing in telecommunications 
which has directly contributed to the establishment 
of several municipal networks in Georgia.  
Figure 9: List of Interviews 
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The questions asked to the interviewees were designed to evaluate the historical and 
economic development of the networks in order to assess the various perspectives on both 
sides of the political debate surrounding municipal networks.  To understand how municipal 
networks justify entrance into the market, questions were asked about the origins of the 
network, the rationale for its economic model, a history of other utility provision or any other 
existing infrastructure, and other similar questions.  To evaluate the effect of the network on its 
competition, questions were asked about financing and payment structures pertaining to the 
cost of the network, initial financing sources, taxes and fees paid to the government, and 
infrastructure improvement and maintenance, as well as the existing competition’s response to 
the buildout of the network.  In order to assess the network’s effect on the community, each of 
the network leaders were asked about its impact on economic development, coverage of anchor 
institutions, and response of the community to government investment into internet 




GEORGIA CASE STUDIES 
5.1. Municipal Networks to Residents 
5.1.1. Thomasville, Camilla, Moultrie, and Cairo: Community Network Services 
 Community Network Services (CNS) network is a fiber ring joining the cities of 
Thomasville, Camilla, Moultrie, and Cairo, Georgia.114  Thomasville, which first began the 
network, heads operations of the network for the four cities and some areas in the surrounding 
counties.   
  
Figure 10: CNS Location (NTIA Shapefiles July 2012) 
 5.1.1.1. Network Overview 
The broadband network began in Thomasville in the mid-1990s. The incumbent at the 
time was BellSouth, which was unwilling to invest in infrastructure in rural Georgia, and instead, 
was pushing their money and efforts into the Atlanta market. In 1995, Thomasville built a fiber 
telecommunications network to improve its medical community and the schools. From 1998 to 
1999, they expanded these services to their commercial and residential customers with a hybrid 
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coaxial network offering internet and cable television service.  Also, they converted the existing 
local dial-up service Rosenet, serving 6000 dial-up customers, to cable.  
The network passes roughly 30,000 homes, with approximately 19,000 video customers, 
10,000-11,000 data customers, and 6,000 voice. Compared to its competition, CNS has 80% of 
the market in their triple-play offerings. 
 5.1.1.2. Support for Anchor Institutions 
The network provides services to more than 65 school sites over ten counties
115
 through 
their Ethernet ring, most of them having 50-100 mbps connectivity. It also serves more than 
500,000 people in South Georgia with state-of-the-art healthcare services due to the capacity of 
the network.  Mike Scott of Moultrie states that government facilities have reduced their 
communication costs by about 50% by installing VoIP. School are connected, even those several 
miles out of the county with a much lower rate than the typical internet subscription which is 
usually a big drag on the budget.
116
   
5.1.1.3. Financing 
The initial installations for hospitals and schools had state financing.  Financing for the 
residential and commercial expansions were bonded, borrowed from the bank, and borrowed 
internally from the electric utility. The fiber network was paid for in 3-5 years, but due to 
expansion projects and IT upgrades, the network is currently not fully paid off. For capital 
improvement projects in extending fiber and upgrading equipment such as switches, routers, 
and multiplexers, they have borrowed from the electric utility, which is cheaper than borrowing 
from the bank because they don’t charge interest, an option the private sector does not have.  
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5.1.1.4. Economic Development 
The network is credited with creating over 6,000 jobs in the health care, customer service, 
and manufacturing industries.
117
  The community has several large businesses, including the 
Flowers Bakery Company and Airfoil Textron, a large aircraft parts manufacturing company with 
military contracts for jet engines. Chris White says: 
“Flowers Bakery started here but could have easily moved their office because they 
bought up a lot of markets. They chose to stay because of our infrastructure. Also, an 
HD supply component of home depot and a data center was put here. We recently 
acquired a large call center and an insurance industry, which is still in the 
developmental stages. We want to gain 500 call center agent jobs.” 118 
Chris White elaborates that companies consider several deciding factors when looking for a 
place to locate including a low tax rate, proximity to interstate or railways for anyone producing 
products, and energy and telecommunications costs.  To help with these costs, the city has a 
local electric utility that charges rates lower than Georgia Power or EMT.  
“While these companies may not have considered broadband as a sole priority, it was 
part of the deciding factor, especially early on when other communities had slower 
speeds. Several businesses told us that it was the city’s ability to meet their needs that 
was the main reason for coming to Thomasville.” 119 
In 2012, the city of Thomasville eliminated its property taxes due to the success of the network.  
Chris says: “we attribute that accomplishment to CNS and its success. We were able to take 
those proceeds and revenues and transfer over to the general fund to pay for roads, signs, fire 
and police protection, and other costs.”
 120




5.1.1.5. Relationship with the Other Stakeholder Cities 
Thomasville’s charter allows it to provide services outside the city’s footprint into 
neighboring counties.  Thomasville came to incorporate the 3 other neighboring cities of 
Moultrie, Camilla, and Cairo because of their historical relationship in forming the South Georgia 
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Business and Development Authority, which was a 4 city consortium for economic development.  
This partnership saves costs by realizing gains from scope creating a unified system for back 
office support, IT services, and utility billing, as well as saving the other towns from having to 
purchase their own voice switches, each of which cost roughly one million dollars.  To actualize 
these gains from scale, Thomasville remains as the sole owner of the telephony switch for all 
services throughout the network; technically, they resell their services and infrastructure for 
core switches and routers at wholesale prices to the other neighborhoods.  Chris White 
elaborates:  
“One thing that makes us successful is because our economies of scales are better. We 
are able to share resources, both technology and test equipment as well as personnel 
and expertise. Cities the size of Cairo couldn’t do it alone. They don’t have the number 
of customers to maintain the back end.” 122 
Mike Scott, City Manager of Moultrie, remembers when the existing cable and telephone 
companies would not invest in their communities and they were afraid of being left behind.
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Moultrie is an agricultural area with full-utility services providing natural gas, solid waste, water, 
sewer, electric, and now telecommunications.
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 City Manager Tony Rojas commented:  
“We need to remember that's exactly why the city council went forward in issuing 
bonds and developing this latest technology or infrastructure for telecommunications 
was because the private sector was not providing that level of service our citizens are 





5.1.2. City of Elberton: ElbertonNET 
 
Figure 11: ElbertonNet Location (NTIA July 2012) 
5.1.2.1. Network Overview 
The Elberton network originally passed 3,500 homes, and after a few expansions to 
outlying neighborhoods, it now passes 4300 homes.  The take rate, the percentage of people 
subscribing to service out of those eligible is about 60% and the other 40 have Comcast, 
satellite, or possibly nothing.
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 Elberton uses a DOCSYS 3.0 modem that has 80 Mbps 
downstream and may be able to do 100. The Elberton network is hybrid fiber and copper, 
including fiber as a backbone and coaxial copper at the neighborhood.  They are planning an 
expansion project to provide fiber all the way to the home in the next few years. Wireless was 
not a good option when many of these neighborhoods were built in the late 90s, early 2000s 
timeline.  
5.1.2.2. Support for Anchor Institutions 
Lanier Dunn, Elberton City Manager and Economic Development Specialist 
In Elberton, we provide to the hospital and they cut their cost by a tenth, from $2000 a 
month to $200. For schools, they have a lot of online textbooks. Some residents come 
to us because they can't get online at home and do their homework. Also there are 
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people who work from home because it's the only jobs they can get and they need 
reliable internet. For schools, they get e-rate to give them internet access from the 
state for free. But we give them a gig network to interconnect them, their phones and 
internal administrative network.”127 
5.1.2.3. Financing 
Elberton funded their network with a capital lease from the national bank Wells Fargo, 
which was then First Union.  The city borrowed the money in 2001 on a 14 year loan, the first 
two years were spent just paying off interest, and the loan is scheduled to be repaid by January 
2015. The system became operational in 2002 and began paying for itself and turning a profit in 
day-to-day operations after 5 years in 2007.  
5.1.2.4. Economic Development 
Elberton sells direct fiberoptic connections to industries.  Lanier Dunn of Elberton says 
three companies have opened up business in Elberton in 2010 that use Fiber Optic. They had a 
T1 option from the private sector, but it was worse and more expensive. 
Lanier Dunn says “Generally, businesses expect broadband, but the quality of life is the 
significant value-added. The city of Elberton has technology that is years beyond our 
neighbors. There is a city 35 miles south of us called Washington. They have an electric 
system, but didn't do anything in telecom. Our homes have been 6 Mbps standard for 
years. In Washington had their phone company built fiber to the home have a 2 meg 
download. As far as quality of life, entertainment, and education, we are 6 to 8 years 
ahead of our neighbors. There is a clear difference in quality of life and what people 




5.1.3. City of Monroe: MonroeAccess.net 
  
Figure 12: MonroeNet Location (NTIA July 2012) 
 5.1.3.1. Network Overview 
The city of Monroe built its broadband network in the late 1990s, early 2000s. It passes 
7000 homes for broadband and 5000 for cable TV, with 50-60 investor-owned commercial 
customers. About 5200, or 78% subscribe to the broadband service and  Approximately 2500-
2800 residential customers subscribe to cable TV, with the others going to Dish Network or 
Direct TV.  Their staffing levels are low, but they have exceptional retention rates, and the least 
amount of time worked is 9 consecutive years.  
They found that Windstream, the local exchange carrier did not want to invest into the 
community and wouldn’t offer any speeds over 1 Mbps.  Also, the city decided to invest into 
phone service because a phone line cost $62 which called for competition.  It now has 1500 
phone line subscribers. Currently, Windstream offers 1.5 Mbps, 3 Mbps at most, while Monroe 
offers 1 to 100 Mbps on the cable modem side.  
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5.1.3.2. Support for Anchor Institutions 
The network provides support to the Walton County School District for about $500 a 
month, approximately five times cheaper than from a private provider.
129
  E-Rate doesn’t 
contribute to the schools because the county is considered too wealthy to qualify. Brian 
Thompson says schools are part of their mission, coded in the discount rate in the 
intergovernmental agreement. 
They provide access to the local hospital, which is the largest paying customer because 
of its need to communicate with all the imaging centers from out of town and other centers. It is 
a guaranteed customer, spending over $22,000 a month, and the revenue helps lower rates for 
everyone else.  
5.1.3.3. Financing 
In 1972, Monroe borrowed funds from the electric utility to build a cable TV network 
when the private providers such as Comcast and Charter, weren't willing to invest in service. The 
network paid the money back to the utility and used its enterprise fund, collected over years of 
saving 5% of its gross income, to build a broadband network.
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The city of Monroe never borrowed or bonded to pay for its network.  The city used its 
capital investment fund from its cable TV revenues for the initial construction and upgrades the 
system from profits. Since the network provides open-access to lease its capacity, it benefits 
from its location between two large population hubs of Atlanta and Athens and it is able to lease 
30 miles of fiber lines to transfer data for Verizon, Comcast, Charter, Time Warner, and 
Windstream.  Brian calls it “being at the right place at the right time”
131
 For example, Comcast 
has an engineering firm customer that pays MonroeNet to transfer its data, as well as to data 
53 
 
centers in Marietta.  Brian says the price for leasing those fiber links yield up to 6 dollars per 
megabit, with more megabits transferred for a cheaper price.  
5.1.3.4. Economic Development 
Monroe has a number of notable businesses that rely on broadband. A Hitachi plant 
located to Monroe because the network allowed them to connect back to their headquarters in 
Michigan, and with it, brought 250 technology manufacturing jobs to the town. Another large 
business customer, Minerva, a beauty salon supplier with a large showroom and distribution 
center, is headquartered in China and requires a reliable way to communicate out of the country 
in real time.  Additionally the network has enticed trucking companies call centers into the 
town.  
5.2. Municipal Networks for Anchor Institutions and Businesses 
5.2.1. City of Dublin: Dublink 
   
Figure 13: DubLink Location (NTIA July 2012) 
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5.2.1.1. Network Overview 
 The City of Dublin’s network provides services to anchor institutions and approximately 
45 to 50 businesses. The project began in 1999 when the Dublin city school system wanted to 
use e-rate funds to build a fiberoptic network for the school to utilize; however, the conditions 
set for E-Rate, a federal program to pay for connectivity to schools under the Universal Service 
Fund, wouldn’t allow the school to own and maintain the network unless they built it 
themselves. The school system turned to the city of Dublin to get involved. Lawrence County is 
unique in that it has a county school system as well as a city school system.  When the network 
was being built, extra capacity was purposely built into it with an eye for the long term, and it is 
leased out to businesses that are willing to pay to install a fiber connection.   
5.2.1.2. Anchor Institutions 
The network has led to a huge improvement in capability of the school systems because, 
before the network, they had no interconnectivity between the schools at all.  The schools are 
able to get 80-90% E-Rate funding.  
5.2.1.3. Financing 
Guy Mullis, the authority for the IT department began working after the network was 
built, so he wasn’t sure where the funding came from.  He suspects it was the general fund 
because the network helps contribute to the general fund and keep taxes low. He doesn’t think 
there was an interest rate charged.  Because the Georgia Public Service Commission frowns 
upon municipalities running their own fiber optic networks which are not profitable, there is an 
increased emphasis on balancing the network’s budget so it is not a burden on taxpayers and 
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not a cost to the city.  The initial investment has not been paid off yet after the 14 years since 
initial investment.   
5.2.1.4. Economic Development 
Guy Mullis recounts:  
“Had we not put this network in place when we did, we wouldn’t have gotten DSL [to 
residents] as fast as we did. AT&T looked like they were going to bypass Dublin, but 
when word got out about the Dublin fiber network, even though we weren’t planning 
to provide residential service, they felt threatened, and put DSL in place.”132 
5.2.2. City of Cartersville: FiberCom 
 5.2.2.1. Network Overview  
The City of Cartersville is one of the cities that built a local loop from its subscription to 
Georgia Public Web’s network.  It has 62 miles of Fiber to the Premise which interconnects and 
provides services to the municipal buildings, substations, and sells extra capacity to businesses, 
including banks, manufacturing plants, car dealerships, and other types of small to medium 
sized businesses. They provide service capable of 50 Mbps and voice services to businesses.   
 5.2.2.2. Support for Anchor Institutions 
 The network connects the school system, utility buildings, county government facilities, 
and supports service to several medical institutions, and occasionally to the local hospital. The 
county government is currently considering outsourcing their IT department to FiberCom. 
 5.2.2.3. Financing 
The network stems from the GPW provision of fiber to the electric plant which is a 
member of MEAG. The electricity utility financed the fiber expansion to the community through 
a reserve fund, which is still being paid off with interest, and the network is operating with a 
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profit. They are able to realize cost savings through automated meter readings and ability to 
remotely turn off electricity, gas, and water.  
 5.2.2.4. Economic development:  
 They advertise based on customer service. The businesses they do provide to have to 
pay for their own connection, but many are willing to do so because of signal reliability and 
quality of service. One multistate company, which only subscribes to Verizon service around the 
country made an exception of buying service from FiberCom. After the city invested into the 
fiber network, AT&T expanded their DSL infrastructure and service offerings in the area.  
5.3. Broadband Technology Opportunities Program for Broadband Infrastructure  
5.3.1. North Georgia Network Cooperative, Inc 
 







 5.3.1.1. Network Overview 
 The North Georgia Network was the first to apply for the BTOP stimulus funds, and the first 
to finish a project.  The network was finished in December 2012 and consists of a 260 mile core, 
which extends to over 1,100 miles total, covers 300 businesses, 42 schools, five colleges and 
universities, 6 libraries, 16 public safety agencies, 17 county and city governments, 29 medical 
facilities, and about 2,000 homes. There are currently more than 4,000 potential connections to 
be completed in the future.  
 Bruce Abraham, a member of the board of directors and the premier economic developer 
for the region, testified in front of the House Energy and Commerce committee about the 
success the network had as a result of the stimulus funds.   In an interview, Abraham recounted 
how the project started over 5 years ago after interviews with local users revealed that local 
internet was unreliable and did not have the advertised capacity.  The Habersham and EMC, the 
local electric utilities partnered with the city to conduct an initial assessment of what needed to 
be done for the program, which allowed the city to properly plan the deployment of the 
network and be accepted for stimulus funds.  
 Abraham says about half of the network was acquired fiber sold by local telecoms, which 
they patched together into a backbone fiber ring.  After the backbone core was built, they built 
the middle mile, and then extension loops. The network follows state routes and sites for state 
boards and schools. For the last mile, they advertised the option to request for a residential 
connection, and most of those who wanted a connection subscribed to service.  The customers 
wanted various degrees for service.   
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 As a cooperative, the operation of the system is split between three organizations.  Several 
of the counties are covered by the partnership rural electric companies that were part of the 
initial assessment of the region: Habersham electric and EMC. The third one is a company called 
Connect North Georgia that they had to create to provide service to three counties outside the 
areas covered by the electric companies because they are restricted to their own electric area.  
At first, private providers were approached to operate the network in the areas not formerly 
served, but the companies said there wasn’t enough density to make it effective for them to 
make the investment to do the last mile.  
 5.3.1.2. Support for Anchor Institutions 
 The anchor institutions were automatically connected because of an obligation to connect 
community anchors under the federal grant guidelines.  Before the network, some of the 
schools had to wait 24 hours to download state Department of Education information.  They had 
to ration computer lab time because they didn’t have the capacity for large groups of users, but 
they had aspirations to use e-textbooks and remote classes through video conferencing. 
 5.3.1.3. Financing 
 The network project cost 42 million dollars, $33,490,537 from NTIA BTOP federal stimulus 
program, and 9 dollars was raised locally for the required 20 % match funds.  Abraham says it 
cost about $25,000 to lay a mile of fiber. 
 5.3.1.4. Economic development 
 Bruce Abraham is proud to say that three months after the project was finished, an $80 
million dollar data center business announced that it would locate into the community, which 
means the community doubled its investment in economic development within 3 months.   In 
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terms of economic development and jobs for the community, Abraham says the data center will 
create 10-12 jobs to operate 24 hours a day, but they will pay $100,000 because of their skill 
level.  Abraham says “this is a 10 dollar an hour economy. I interview the employers and they 
pay 10 dollars an hour because that’s what the industries can pay for the skill level people have 
here.  It is starting out on 3 gigabits of service.  Abraham says that the owner of the data center 
told him: “this is just the beginning. I am flypaper; once I start this enterprise, there will be other 
technology entrants because they want to be close to our horsepower and our data storage, all 
we did was crack the door open to allow something to happen here that couldn’t happen here 
before.”134 
5.4. Method Validity 
 The interview method is useful for gathering relevant information, but since it comes 
from one authoritative source, it may result in inaccurate or biased information.  Local 
authorities are more likely to present their communities and efforts as positive, and some 
degree of bias is inherent.  
5.5. Next Steps/Further Research 
For a more complete picture of Georgia networks, more of the local economic development 
leaders from the other cities can be interviewed.  A future study could measure the number of 
competitors before and after the introduction of one or more economic models of municipal 
networks to compare the effect of municipal competition on price, service quality, and 
investment of competitors.  Another study can compare the common causes behind a 
municipality choosing a particular economic model for broadband including government owned 
infrastructure, public private partnerships, cooperatives, competitive local exchange carriers, or 
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through federal grants, on an aggregate level. Another study could compare the successful and 
failed municipal broadband networks in Georgia, but many of the officials who worked during 
when networks failed are now retired or working other jobs.  
Very little research, even those like the municipal broadband branch of the Institute for 
Local Self Reliance (ILSR), the premier organization for dealing with this issue, has ever done to 
design a thorough econometric method of evaluating the success of municipal networks. Studies 
that evaluate the effectiveness of broadband in general have taken measures such as number of 
jobs gained after the improvement in internet capacity, while controlling for other factors such 
as tax rates, unionization, and industrialization. Coming up with a measure of “success” is 
difficult because many factors such as gains from education, democratic participation, economic 
development are not only hard to measure, but difficult to compare to the alternative, if a plan 
for a community broadband network was not implemented. In coming up with an econometric 
method, this study yields valuable results.  Firstly, if a community is able to actualize gains from 
scale, the likelihood of its success will go up. Gains from scale may be actualized if the 
community provides other utilities such as  electricity, natural gas, water, waste management, 
and other systems that form a resident customer base, provide customer service capability, and 
employ expertise (particularly in IT).  
 Another area of relevant research could be how a community decides what ownership 
model to choose: whether it provides retail services, wholesale services, engages in a 
partnership or a cooperative, and the corresponding decision making structure.  Also, the 
impact of availability of wireless internet makes it more financially viable to invest in wireless 
broadband infrastructure with better results.  One interesting study could be determining the 





The literature review and interview results reveal that government provision of broadband 
services can be considered as a public utility based on historical patterns of regulation and some 
economic interpretations of market failure. The case studies offer evidence that criticism against 
municipal broadband, including arguments that government diminishes competition by 
crowding out private investment, provides a poorer quality of service than the private sector, 
and lack a set of best practices are flawed.   
6.1. Historical Significance of Utility Regulation on Broadband as a Utility 
Having a historical relationship with the community in utility provision makes the 
municipality more likely to provide broadband service (see Figure 14
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).  Many of the cities that 
provided broadband, also provide their own electricity, waste, and water utilities.  To a certain 
extent, it's a logical progression or path-dependency to provide broadband like other 
government-provided utilities before it.  As Brian Thompson of Monroe states: "in late 1800s 
and early 1900s, the need was ice and refrigeration, so Monroe utility created was an ice plant, 
a kind of community ice box to keep your milk cold. To keep ice, you need a good water supply, 
so they started a water system. Then you need a power system to power the operation."
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  In 
turn, broadband helps facilitate the industrial control systems for the electric utilities.  Bruce 
Abraham adds: “it seems that the broadband systems which are most successful have the other 









Cities were looking for better service not only to meet current internet demand, but 
past demand for television and phone service. For example, in Elberton, the priority goal for 
building a network was initially to improve cable TV service because the incumbent cable TV 
provider, Comcast, which had served the area since the 1960s, was considered to provide poor 
service. Internet service was not the top priority, but a positive byproduct, because it did not 
permeate the lives of individuals as much as it does today.
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 For example, in public hearing held 
in Elberton, a Comcast government representative stated that the city was too rural for them to 
ever provide internet in the region because they would never make money there.
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 The 
historical pattern of service provision contributed to the municipality’s decision. Lamar Greeson, 
the Telecommunications Manager for the city of Cartersville, says part of the reason they are 
not providing service to residents is because they never built a cable network: “it would have 
been easier if we had done [cable] video at one time to serve as a base for revenue to pay for 
internet infrastructure because at that point, provision of internet is free as far as costs are 
concerned.”141   
Similarly, the city of Elberton started to provide electricity in the streets since the late 1890s, 
while the large cities were served by the investor owned utility which has become the Georgia 
Power Company. The Elberton government is "known for taking the lead and bringing things to 
the community such as water, electricity, and natural gas. The city is very organized and we 
63 
 
serve the people with everything we need: broadband is a natural extension of what we do, the 
customer service, administration, billing, warehousing, customer service, and broadband is just 
an add-on.  The infrastructure took extra financing, but the sunk costs for the rest are already in 
place.” Lanier Dunn elaborates: "There was nobody lining up to do it unless we did it ourselves, 
from water, roads, to sewer and broadband. It might not be the case in a large city, but here it 
wasn't an option. Atlanta had electricity since late 1800s, and some parts of Georgia didn't have 
it until 60 years later”
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The cities that were interested in deploying municipal broadband in Georgia were typically 
those that operated their own electric systems because they had a stable customer base and a 
history of independent utility provision.  Some of these electricity providers were also afraid 
that they might have to compete for business and lose their operating capacity, it seemed like 
getting into telecommunications would maintain their authority
143
. Internet service could also 
assist existing utility functions. For example, the city of Elberton actualizes cost-savings on meter 
readings from the local water customers and video surveillance of with water plant.  
The electric utilities have also helped fund the broadband networks. In Monroe, GA, for 
example, the local electric utility was not directly involved in broadband, but its enterprise fund 
provided the investment necessary to lead to the building of the broadband network.  
Thomasville borrowed from its utility with no interest to fund its network as well.  
Electric utilities own the rights of way and benefit from pole attachment fees that municipalities 
pay. 
6.2. Implications of Economic Viewpoints on Government Entry into Broadband 
Provision 
Economic viewpoints and doctrine significantly contribute to how the private and public 
sectors see their role in meeting demand and closing market failures.  From the private sector 
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perspective, inadequate service from a private provider does not mean that the municipality is 
justified in calling the situation a market failure. The private sector is more likely to view 
competition and market failure from a Conservative Neoclassicist perspective where the 
government is harmful to competition, and in most cases, the competition in 
telecommunications is sufficient to remain the best option for providing service.  As Brian 
Adkins points out that they provide service in the areas that municipal broadband is deployed:   
"It’s hardly ever the case that a municipal provider has the goal of reaching those on 
the outskirts, it’s always in the town area. In that case, because we are already there 
and providing, generally I don’t hear us refusing to build because of a municipal 
project, we typically object to their premise that they’re building because we haven’t 
done so."144 
On the other hand, municipalities are more likely to see that government intervention can 
spur economic development, innovation, and improve quality of life from a different economic 
perspective that believes that government can improve the competitive situation in the market 
economy. In effect, the utilities and the customer payments are returned back to the 
community.  For example, the pole fees are going to the local electric company and charge 
themselves for pole attachments, which keep the money within the community.
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Brian Thompson Comments:  
“If you can pull it off and do it right while maintaining the quality of service, broadband 
utilities are very beneficial for all the residents and quality of life for the community.  
The customers’ goal is to spend that money, they will buy data and voice services from 
somebody, why not buy from yourself at a lower rate and save yourself money.”146 
 
This difference in viewpoints is explained by the fact that private industries and local 
governments have a different set of interests and incentives in making broadband available to a 
community, which directly affects each potential provider’s decision of whether to provide 
telecommunications services.147  
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A private Internet Service Provider is interested in realizing their return on investment and 
making a profit from subscribers.  “Large national service providers may require densities as 
high as 3,000 households per square mile before they will consider installing a network… 
anything less does not ensure them of the subscription revenue they estimate they will need to 
offset the cost of building the network”
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Brian Adkins, Senior Director of Federal Legislative Affairs at CenturyLink provides a valuable 
perspective representative of the private sector approach to broadband investment:  
“We look at how long it would take to recover the investment: how much will it cost to 
deploy, how many customers are there, and how much return do we expect. The 
calculations work out to how many years are required to recover the investment. We 
like to invest into things that will be recovered in 5 years or fewer, not sure if that’s 
the horizon, but it was the horizon at some point. When you get above that, as a 
publically owned company, we have to answer to our investors who oversee the 
company say: wouldn’t that dollar spent be better doing something else? What you 
are really competing with is: every dollar you spend pushing fiber to those who are 
unserved in a rural area, the question to investors is, at what point would that dollar 
be better spent simply adding capacity and speeds, or marketing to more large 
corporate customers. So you are forever making the case to investors that this 
investment will be recovered in these rural places.”149 
Municipal governments, on the other hand, are motivated by economic development, 
civic engagement, social inclusion, equity, and community welfare.
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  Private companies face 
greater pressure to show profitability in the short-term, typically three to five years, whereas 
governments can have the advantage of long-term investments to be repaid in as low as five to 
seven years and as high as twenty-five or thirty years.
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 Based on the interviews, every single 
government that invested into their own broadband network did so because a private company 




6.3. Addressing Criticisms against Municipal Broadband 
6.3.1. Criticism: Government-Entry Crowds out Private Competition 
6.3.1.1. Government-Entrance into the Market Undermines the Private Sector 
Critics also say that municipalities distort the market through exemptions and effectively 
deter new entrants.
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 Based on the case studies, municipal networks do not discourage 
competition, in fact, they encourage it.  Representatives from Georgia municipal networks 
definitively say that their local efforts encouraged the competitors to provide better service, 
drop their prices, and invest into the community. Municipal broadband has been shown to 
lower competitor prices in some cases.153 
Chris White of CNS says that investing into their own network pushed the local incumbents to… 
“do what they did at least four to five years early. Once we built our networks, 
within 18-24 months, the ILEC and competitors began to upgrade their networks.  
They wouldn’t have done what they did if it hadn’t been for us. They would have 
the same service offering that they have today in most of our market.”154 
Similarly, Lanier Dun of Elberton says:  
“Comcast didn’t offer internet in 2000-2001, but when we started building and 
finished in 2002, they started offering cable modem internet. When we started was 
DSL and if you didn’t live far enough. Because we did what we did and they were afraid 
of losing TV customers they started offering but they weren’t going to start spending 
that money until they had to. Didn’t work it was too late and were building.”155   
Furthermore, he elaborates: 
“Compared to other networks, I’ve seen this firsthand for example, Valdosta, GA 60 
miles away has Mediacom and AT&T as the two competitors there and they have 
significantly higher rates in that market than they do here because they don’t have a 
competitor up there. Even if we didn’t have the same customer, just because we are 
here our community would experience a cost savings.” 156   
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 6.3.1.2. Unfair advantage:  
Private companies often criticize municipal utilities that they use tax revenue to pay for their 
networks, and that they have an unfair advantage in financing over the private companies; 
however, none of the Georgia cities directly use tax revenue for broadband investment. The 
state of Georgia requires that municipality corporations pay the same franchise fees, and pole 
attachment fees as a private company.  Many sell revenue bonds to private investors,
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 private 
loans, or federal grants.  The loans have to be repaid just like with a private company, and they 
have to pay the same fees and taxes that a private company would.   In fact, CNS pays a higher 
price for pole attachments than the private competitors because of the higher rate they 
negotiated 15-18 years ago.
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  In reality, public providers are subject to greater regulations 
than the private sector and incur additional costs from civil service requirements, public 
hearings, keeping public records, Davis-Bacon labor cost issues, in addition to the mandates for 
any provider such as Universal Service, reporting, and e911.
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Since municipalities have widely varying local charters, they are allowed to do different 
things as a public utility.  Many local charters do not allow for cross-subsidization, loans from 
the general fund, loans from any other utility, or interest-free loans. Other charters allow 
governments to borrow from the general fund for broadband infrastructure investments, or 
interest-free loans from the utility, but those are rare, according to telecommunications lawyer 
Jim Baller.  Most often, broadband investment is paid for with a loan from the electric utility, 
cable TV utility, or private company with interest to be repaid over the course of approximately 
anywhere from 10 to 25 years. Indeed, municipalities are able to spread out these investment 
costs over a longer period of time than a private company which seeks to realize a return on its 
investment in about three to five years.  
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On the other hand, public funding already distorts the broadband market for private 
providers with subsidies, and they are able to cross-subsidize across regions and services. 
Georgia Representative Debbie Buckner pointed out "they talk about [the companies] as if they 
are totally free market and free enterprise, but doesn't AT&T get some tax breaks? … Didn't 
Windstream get some stimulus money? Isn't that government money?" An Institute on Taxation 
and Economic Policy study from 2011 determined that AT&T and Verizon received about $26 
billion in tax subsidies from 2008 through 2010.
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  The Connect America Fund provides 
subsidies to private companies to extend service to rural areas.  Mitchell Shapiro adds, “ 
“To me, these issues are red herrings raised by incumbents.  Large incumbent 
providers have many advantages over municipal networks, including lower 
programming and equipment costs, the ability to cross-subsidize steep 
discounts in markets in which they face municipal competition by raising prices 
in markets where they face no competition, among other ways.  They complain 
about any advantage a municipality has, but aggressively exploit (and use 
legislation and other means to augment) the advantages they enjoy.  So I don’t 
take seriously their complaints that municipalities may enjoy some advantages, 
including some related to financing.”161 
6.3.1.3. Arbitrary Price Setting 
Another facet of the government crowds out competition argument is that 
municipalities engage in arbitrary price setting when they are not faced with a competitive 
environment.  Based on the interviews, the extent of competition that is there in the region, as 
well as the cost of the service contributes to the rate structure that municipalities set for 
broadband services. Lamar Greeson of FiberCom states that his rate structure for businesses is 
highly dependent on competitor rates. He says they are not always the cheapest, and it is always 
a business case of calculating how much it would cost to deploy the fiber, if the investment can 
be realized in three years, renegotiating the contract under different terms like higher rates or a 
longer contract if it won’t be cost effective, and change customers if it is not a good business 
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case. Guy Mullis of Dublink says they are in the process of rethinking their rate structure, but it 
is based on cost and competition factors. Their service is more expensive than the local DSL 
competitor because they have to charge for installation, but they can keep in mind the needs of 
the business, and negotiate the contract based on mutually favorable terms. It is important to 
note that  
6.3.2. Criticism: Poor Quality of Service 
The criticism that government owned infrastructure is likely to suffer from slow adaptation 
to technological improvements is tenuous in the case of municipal broadband.  Municipalities 
who entered broadband provision in the late 1990s, early 2000s timeframe typically invested in 
fiber because it had higher capacity and comparable prices to the alternatives.  Since they were 
likely to build in areas where private providers are not willing to meet their demand, upgrades 
to their fiber infrastructure have generally been able to keep up with demand and provide 
comparable service to local private providers who are likely to leverage existing cable or copper 
infrastructure.   For those areas, it is easier to keep up with technological changes and 
competition. The municipalities that utilize a previously built cable TV infrastructure to provide 
internet service, like Monroe, on average have slower speeds than the municipalities that are 
completely fiber; so much of the capacity for improvement has to do with the type of 
technology deployed in the area.   
Quality of service also includes quality of customer service and responsiveness. Local 
networks are able to have an advantage from flexibility to the customer and reliability of the 
network and, which may of them use as a base for their marketing efforts.  The ability to create 
cookie-cutter and customized approaches to each customer’s demand is one of the most 
valuable offerings of a municipal broadband utility. The CNS representative, Chris White says: 
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“we are extremely flexible on being able to meet the business’s demands.”
162
  Municipal 
broadband does offer certain advantages to private companies.  Monroe has been able to tailor 
its offerings to each business that wants to locate in their community.  They can ask a business 
what they would need, and extend the proper capacity necessary to meet that business's 
demand.  Because their presence is local, they are dramatically faster and more effective at 
providing network support to residential and business customers as well.  
CNS representative Chris White describes the customer service in his network:  
“At the end of the day, the product may be the same, may be 5 Mbps, that us and 2 
other providers can provide but neither have a local presence, when call and have a 
problem, have to talk to call center in Idaho, their response time for issues is 
sometimes 72 hours for longer. Bill is higher and the customer can’t talk to 
anybody locally, try to go above and beyond. All said and done it differentiates us. 
That and proceeds stay in the community”163 
Lanier Dunn says:  
“We compete on hometown service- being able to be there same day within the 
hour- you know us and can depend on it. Internet service rarely goes down, 
reliable, businesses can depend on it. We can't compete in price with the private 
companies because can drop prices as low as they want to, but we can compete in 
customer service”164 
Similarly in Monroe:  
“Comcast has terrible customer service. If you call in this morning, we can guarantee 
you someone will be at your house by the afternoon, people of Monroe are used to 
that kind of service where they can come to the office. Get the attention they want. 
Flexibility of a locally owned system: to be able to string high speed data lines into the 
city and be flexible to fit the needs of every customer. They’re responsible to the 
shareholders and were responsible to the public, or to the customer.”165  
Lamar Greeson of FiberCom adds: 
 “If [the incumbents] were better at customer service, they wouldn’t lose any business. 
In our particular case, we are able to babysit our customers, while they don’t have the 
time or the money to invest. They don’t understand the person in a foreign country or 
they read off the list, there are many liability considerations.”166 
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6.3.3. Criticism: Lack of a Business Model or Best Practices 
ALEC criticizes municipalities for lacking a business model and a set of best practices. 
Municipalities vary widely in local demand for telecommunications, existing infrastructure, 
provisions of local charters dealing with financing of infrastructure investment, resources, and 
other factors that create a wide spectrum of local characteristics and various considerations that 
are taken into account before deciding on an economic model for municipal broadband 
investment. Mitchell Shapiro corroborates: “To a large extent, each community really needs to 
look at its own specific situation.  Then it might make sense to look for other communities that 
have similar situations, opportunities, resources, constraints, etc.”167  While a unified business 
model for municipal broadband investment may never exist, the following may serve to 
summarize best practices gathered from literature and case studies. 
 6.3.3.1. Conducting a Thorough Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 Many public attempts at providing these opportunities often suffer from poor planning, 
a lack of technical knowledge, and high unexpected costs.
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 Municipal broadband is less likely 
to run into problems and it does seem to drive economic development if it is planned, 
organized, and implemented with proper precautions and a comprehensive cost-benefit 
analysis.  
A comprehensive cost-benefit analysis is essential to success. Even though governments 
may have some alternate incentives for investment and sources of capital, it is important to 
remember that broadband is hardly a profit making venture; Brian Adkins summarizes it well: 
“why would there be these magic market areas that private providers have lost money on and 
municipalities can make profits.”
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 Indeed, researchers at MIT found that municipalities in 





Researchers Balhoff and Rowe in “Municipal Broadband: Digging Beneath the Surface” find that 
the typical Government operated network cost-benefit analysis is inadequate because “the 
initial investment is generally higher than planned; penetration rates are systematically 
overestimated; revenues earned are lower than expected due to responses from competitors; 
and operating costs are almost always underestimated”.
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  Obstacles are typically discovered 
after the network begins construction or is activated.  The North Georgia Network, for example, 
ran into unanticipated environmental impact costs necessitated by NEPA under the stipulations 
for the BTOP grant program. 
In Georgia, many cities started their own systems in the late 1990s- early 2000s time 
period.  Cities like Marietta, Fairburn, and Acworth had to sell at a loss.
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  Brian Thompson of 
Monroe says from those who divested, “did it in the late 90s.  Covington was one that got in 
early and sold out to Charter. Our city charter makes it difficult to divest of a utility once you 
start it.  There is a network for sale bond now, in Forsyth, north of Macon”
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.  In the case of 
Marietta FiberNet, After investing $35 million on building and maintaining the network, the 
upgrades and maintenance was risky and expensive, so they sold it for $11.2 million. The 
problem was said to be “failure to generate enough revenue to cover all the costs associated 




In Elberton, city officials hired a Florida electrical engineering company to conduct the 
market analysis for the cost of the network.  In retrospect, (the title) of the Elberton network, 
believes the analysis was too aggressive in its estimates of number of houses that could be 
passed, the price they could charge, and the projected subscriber count. These lessons point to 
the importance of conducting a realistic cost-benefit analysis.  
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The success of the Monroe network shows that it is important to leverage location.  
Whereas Monroe is able to make a lot of money from leasing fiberlinks to private companies to 
transfer data, CNS network is located in the southern portion of the state, and makes much less 
money partnering to provide bandwidth. Bruce says “it’s about 150,000 a year and service 
partnerships yield probably a quarter mil.  This is not a high percentage of your revenue, less 
than 10%. It’s also muddier with us because we are 4 cities and some components are regional 
where everyone shares and some are just theirs.”
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High population density urban cities are typically well-served by a number of 
competitors. Government entry may distort the market and drive away businesses.  On the 
other hand, it is more rational for a smaller region (approximately less than 100,000-170,000 
residents) which anticipates that the private market is not likely to provide the infrastructure 
necessary for their economic development in a desirable amount of time to take advantage of 
its subsidized costs and its ability to spread out the investment over a long period of time.  
 6.3.3.2. Community buy-in  
Brian Thompson reflects that one of the reasons other communities don’t succeed is 
because they are lacking community buy-in.  Many residents, particularly in a conservative 
political environment, don’t think local governments should be in the private sector business.  
He says:  
“I guess we had a pretty good relationship with the community here. We did things 
like marketing and branding during parades and 4th of July fireworks with an 
enterprise philosophy. So we have more loyalty here than in other communities. 
Trust took time to achieve, and we gained some from providing other utilities as 
well. We have been in the municipal utility environment for a long time, since 1906 
when we started providing electric service”176 
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 6.3.3.4. Taking Advantage of Gains from Scale, Sunk Costs, and Anchor Tenancy 
Communities have to leverage the technology they already have in place to take full 
advantage of their infrastructure and realize cost-savings in the long run.  Most communities 
have invested into hybrid fiber-coaxial, but wireless and mesh networks increasingly have 
greater capacity, but their availability may be challenged by the transition in spectrum allocation 
by the FCC.  
“Anchor Tenancy” is a term meaning the government is able to reduce the risks and 
costs to the private sector by aggregating demand and assuring a stable consumer base for 
broadband services in order to attract investments.  Anchor tenancy, which involves 
government aggregating its own buying power as a strategy to attract provider investments, is 
conceptually separate from a buying cooperative, but the two strategies are often combined in 
practice. For example, Pennsylvania combined the networking contracts of multiple state 
agencies into a single contract, guaranteeing a large volume of state business to a provider 
willing to make reduced telecommunications pricing available to state and local government 
offices in underserved rural areas.”
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 The anchor institutions inside a town, particularly the 
hospital, but also schools, government institutions, and other high paying, reliable customers 
are the most desirable customers within the town because they are a large reliable source of 
income. Municipalities need those users to be able to provide service to the rest of the 
community. If a private provider already covers service to those intuitions, it will be difficult of 
the municipal provider to receive a reliable source of revenue to make sure that they can 
provide to the rest of the community.  
Lamar Greeson of Cartersville, a city that interconnects its facilities and provides to 
businesses says if a city wants to get into the broadband market but “don’t have cable TV or an 
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electric utility, I’m not sure how easy it would be to invest, but I would recommend any city that 
was able to have dark fiber between their facilties to do it because of cost-savings and all the 
things you can do with it” 178 
Brian Adkins adds a private sector perspective:  
“Sometimes we will encounter providers that cover the anchors and want us to cover 
the rest. They want the best customers, so there is a disincentive. They wrecked the 
economic model for the community to get broadband for the rest. It is appealing for 
them to say we will do broadband to the hospital, if we are in the area we already 
provide broadband to the hospital; everyone knows they’re the best customer. But if 
you skim off the cream of the crop, and leave the rest to take care of the area and 
want others to provide to the area, you are really injuring the case for investment in 
that area. If there is a way to make the anchor institution thing work, the theory is 
supposed to be we pull this high capacity middle mile to the hospital, now and the 
local provider can hook into those lines and that will enhance their ability to provide 
fiber to the surrounding community”179 
Bruce Thompson speculates that other networks fail because they are not big enough to sustain 
the operation and don’t have enough cost-sharing mechanisms like CNS, other times it may be 
mismanagement. Also, forward thinking can help actualize these gains from scale: Bruce says: 
“we are creating a new industrial park and we’ve already built some fiber infrastructure out 




 6.3.3.4. Considering the Changing Marketplace 
 Cities have to keep up with technology upgrades. Thomasville’s CNS network has 
upgraded their systems approximately 3 or 4 times. Chris White says if they were to restart from 
scratch today, they would build a:  
“GPON or a Passive Optical Network (PON) because the cost of fiber has been 
decreasing and the cost of cables has gone up because of the copper in the middle. 
When the network was built in 2000, the state of the art technology was a dedicated 




The markets for voice and video services are changing. The percentage of those 
subscribing to landline phone service is going down. Today, Thomasville wouldn’t want to build 
a network with a voice offering.  Also, because of increasing costs programmers are charging for 
video service, video prices are going up, while the proliferation of online video subscription 
services like Netflix are driving demand for video services down: “the programmers cost is so 
high that no margin for profit, you can’t charge what you need, and a lot of people are doing 
away with video offerings.”
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 Lanier Dunn of Elberton adds:  
“The percentage of internet subscribers to TV subscribers, has grown.  Typically, TV is 
the bread and butter that everything is based on, and usually is about 20-30% of TV 
subscriptions, but ours has really grown, and now internet is about 75% compared to 
the number of TV subscribers.  This change is probably due to 2008 and 2009 growth 
in tablets, iPads, and game consoles used for Netflix and other video subscription 
services.  Netflix now accounts for something like a third of internet traffic at night. 
You can tell when people get home from school at 4:00 pm, back off at about 6:30 for 
eating, and from 8:00 to 1:00 am are slamming the internet.”183 
Brian Thompson of Monroe adds that the cost of building networks now is higher than in 
the 1990s: 
“the costs of construction and poles are higher. They are looking at a 15 million project 
in Stockbridge. We built our fiber over 15 years and as we could, not all at once, but 
five to ten thousand at a time. It’s hard to try jump into it with no support structure 
without fiber plant. Our support structure was cable plant that supported internet 
plant.”184 
For Greenfields, the technology in newly developing neighborhoods should be chosen for 
with the long-run in mind.  Most communities that invest into new neighborhoods build directly 
fiber to the home because the technology is cheap and it’s the most cost-effective return on 
investment in the long run.  
Guy Mullis from Dublin agrees:  
“Infrastructure costs are higher now, no telling how much it would cost to deploy the 
same network. We deployed our network alongside the telecom boom and everyone 
has seen that slow down. It’s very hard for someone to go and do that unless it was a 
situation in which they were still lacking in that field like if service providers are not up 
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to speed in what the citizens need. It’s hard for municipalities to do this nowadays 
unless why wanted to go out and try to compete with a billion dollar private 
enterprise. If they see if there is a market for that, they should compete.”185 
 6.3.3.5. Establishing Pilot Areas 
Secondly, the municipality should adopt pilot or trial areas (possibly those with the highest 
demand) to better measure the costs and benefits of establishing the network before taking the 
full responsibility of providing infrastructure to the entire locality.  More accurate 
measurements  and a carefully planned phasing-in process can help better estimate the rate of 
adoption for the network, continue to gauge demand, and avoid some of the negative local 
effects of unexpectedly high costs.  It may be that they need to change strategy or the type of 




POLICY PRESCRIPTION: PRESERVE COMMUNITY FLEXIBILITY IN 
MAKING DECISIONS ABOUT BROADBAND INFRASTRUCTURE 
Operators of municipal broadband argue that limiting local government investment in 
municipal broadband network infrastructure is detrimental to the deployment of broadband 
networks because municipalities have certain advantages they can offer the broadband market. 
Historical trends of utility regulation show that the public sector has a vested interest in 
regulating broadband service or providing it as a utility for the public good.  Though subscribers 
to the traditional conservative neoclassical economic view who pushed for the bill restricting 
municipal broadband in Georgia believe that the broadband market is sufficiently competitive 
and that government intervention would have negative effects, other economic perspectives 
consider government participation as promoting public welfare, helping meet public demand, 
and stimulating innovation.  The case studies in this work present overwhelming anecdotal 
evidence that entrance of municipalities into the market stimulates competition, and pressures 
incumbents to upgrade their local infrastructure to provide better service. Municipalities also 
provide higher quality of customer service because of their proximity to the local institutions, 
businesses, and residents.  
 Allowing communities to preserve their flexibility in providing broadband can promote Next 
Generation Networks because the public sector and private sectors can cooperate to leverage 
their individual advantages for mutual benefit.  Municipal providers often don’t offer as low of 
prices, as wide a variety of service, or the latest technology as would a private provider in a 
competitive urban market. It may be that much of the demand and opportunity to create purely 
municipal networks is decreasing on account of higher investment costs and changing market 
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structures, but the need for creative and unique solutions to meet local broadband demand in 
the building of next generation networks and interconnected systems requires flexibility for 
creative and unique solutions.   
 Local municipal participation and investment is likely to be particularly helpful to developing 
dynamic models that may work to meet the particular needs of their communities. The public 
sector has advantages in spreading out costs over time and providing reliable and flexible 
customer support, whereas the private sector is able to cross-subsidize different services they 
offer in different regions, and is generally considered to provide efficient management of 
network infrastructure.  As a result, municipalities and private companies can both potentially 
participate in a number of partnerships in providing broadband infrastructure such as providing 
incentives, subsidies, and facilitating coordination of construction projects.   For example, 
CenturyLink is working with a municipality to pull a high capacity middle mile to the hospital, 
and the local provider can hook into those lines and enhance their ability to provide fiber to the 
surrounding community. “These types of cost sharing agreements can be additive, rather than 
competitive”, says Brian Adkins of CenturyLink.   
 The new offerings by Google Fiber, where Kansas City, MO agreed to "make space available 
to Google in City facilities for the installation of Google’s Central Office equipment and for 
additional network facilities, [will] provide power necessary for Google’s equipment at City 
locations, [and] will not charge Google for such space, power, or related services” represent 
what is likely to be a pattern in expanding and maintaining Next Generation broadband 
networks.  Local governments may find that relaxing cumbersome permit application processes, 
reducing the period of time for permit issuance, or lifting excessive fees for the use of public 
property can lower the cost for commercial providers to deploy infrastructure in the area.  Guy 
Mullis from Dublin, says he would love to sell broadband to Google Fiber or any other company 
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that wanted to purchase or lease the excess capacity of Dublink’s dark fiber, he says “it all 
comes down to the business case, if it’s a good deal.”186 
 Local government flexibility, active participation, and cooperation with telecommunications 
companies encourage communities’ ability to establish mutually beneficial partnerships in 
broadband deployment. This dynamic approach of leveraging public and private advantages in  
broadband infrastructure investment and operations type of approach is an evolution to the 
regulated monopoly approach to communication networks in the 20th century because public 
institutions can continue to demand the level service they require from private providers, while 












The House Committee on Energy, Utilities and Telecommunications 
offers the following substitute to HB 282:  
A BILL TO BE ENTITLED AN ACT  
1 To amend Title 36 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, relating to local 
government, 2 so as to enact the "Municipal Broadband Investment Act"; to 
allow for public providers of 3 broadband service to provide such services in 
unserved areas; to provide for a short title; to 4 provide for definitions; to prohibit 
a public provider from providing broadband service to 5 areas that are not 
unserved areas unless such provider is providing such broadband service 6 as of a 
date certain; to provide for the authority and jurisdiction of the Public Service 7 
Commission to make a determination as to whether an area is an unserved area 
and as to 8 certain violations; to provide for procedures; to provide a cause of 
action and for recovery; 9 to provide for rules and regulations; to provide for 
related matters; to repeal conflicting laws;  




11 BE IT ENACTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF GEORGIA:  
12 SECTION 1. 13 Title 36 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, relating to 
local government, is amended 14 by adding a new chapter to read as follows:  
15 "CHAPTER 90A  
16 36-90A-1. 17 This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the 'Municipal 
Broadband Investment 18 Act.'  
19 36-90A-2. 20 As used in this chapter, the term: 21 (1) 'Broadband service' 
means Internet access service with transmission speeds that are 22 equal to or 
greater than 3.0 megabits per second in the faster direction.  






23 (2) 'Census block'  means an area so designated by the United States decennial 
census 24 of 2010 or any future census. 25 (3) 'Commission' means the Public 
Service Commission. 26 (4) 'National Broadband Map' means a map showing 
broadband availability across the 27 United States created and maintained by the 
National Telecommunications and 28 Information Administration in collaboration 
with the Federal Communications 29 Commission. 30 (5) 'Private provider' means 
any person, firm, partnership, corporation, or association, 31 other than a public 
provider, offering broadband service. 32 (6) 'Public provider' means any county, 
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municipal corporation, or other political 33 subdivision of this state which 
provides broadband service, whether directly, indirectly, 34 or through any 
authority or instrumentality acting on behalf of or jointly with other public 35 
providers, for the benefit of any county, municipal corporation, or other political 
36 subdivision of this state; provided, however, that such term shall not include a 
municipal 37 corporation, or any authority or instrumentality of a municipal 
corporation, that owns or 38 operates an electric utility. 39 (7) 'Unserved area' 
means a census block for which the National Broadband Map shows 40 no 
broadband service is available.  
41 36-90A-3. 42 (a) On and after July 1, 2013, a public provider shall only offer 
broadband service to 43 unserved areas; provided, however, that such public 
provider may: 44 (1) Continue to offer broadband service to any census block to 
which it provided 45 broadband service on or before June 30, 2013; and 46 (2) 
Offer broadband service to any census block in which it had, on or before June 30, 
47 2013, infrastructure capable of providing broadband service. 48 (b) A public 
provider seeking to provide broadband service in an area shall file a petition 49 
with the commission for a determination that such area is an unserved area. The 
public 50 provider shall include with the petition a list of any census blocks that 
encompass the 51 proposed area. Upon a determination by the commission that all 
of the census blocks in 52 a proposed area are unserved areas, the public provider 
may commence the provision of 53 broadband service in such unserved areas.  
54 36-90A-4. 55 At any time, upon its own complaint or the complaint of any 
private provider or any other 56 interested party, the commission shall have the 
authority and jurisdiction, after notice to  
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13 LC 36 2327S57 all affected broadband service providers and interested parties, 
and after a hearing, to make 58 a determination of any violation of this chapter by 
appropriate orders.  
59 36-90A-5. 60 If any public provider does, causes, or permits any act with is 
prohibited, forbidden, or 61 declared to be unlawful under this chapter, or fails to 
do any act which is required by an 62 order of the commission, such public 
provider shall be liable to the persons affected 63 thereby for all loss, damage, or 
injury caused thereby or resulting therefrom. An action to 64 declare such an act 
or failure to act unlawful, enjoin the same, and recover loss, damage, 65 or injury 
may be brought in any court of competent jurisdiction by any such persons 66 
affected. In case of recovery, if the jury finds that such act or failure to act was 
willful, it 67 may fix a reasonable attorney's fee, which shall be taxed and 
collected as part of the costs 68 of the case.  
69 36-90A-6. 70 The commission shall have the authority to promulgate such 
rules and regulations as it 71 deems necessary to carry out the provisions and 
intention of this chapter."  
72 SECTION 2. 73 All laws and parts of laws in 
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City Level of Broadband Provision 
Adel  
Albany Provides to businesses and anchor institutions 
Barnesville  
Blakely   
Cairo  CNS Network: Provides to residents, businesses, and anchor institutions 
Calhoun  Provides to Anchor institutions, no mention of if also provide to 
businesses: (corroborated by ILSR and http://www.cityofcalhoun-
ga.com/Telecommunications/Default.aspx) 
Camilla  CNS Network: Provides to residents, businesses, and anchor institutions 
Cartersville  
Commerce   




Douglas   
Elberton  Provides to residents, businesses, and anchor institutions 
Ellaville   
Fairburn  Registered as a CLEC, may provide internet service 
Fitzgerald  
Forsyth  Registered as a CLEC, may provide internet service 
Fort Valley  Provides to residents, businesses, and anchor institutions 
Griffin  Registered as a CLEC, may provide internet service 
LaGrange  Provides to businesses and anchor institutions 
Marietta   
Monticello   
Moultrie  CNS Network: Provides to residents, businesses, and anchor institutions 
Newnan Registered as a CLEC, may provide internet service 
Norcross   
Palmetto   
Quitman   
Sandersville  Provides to businesses and anchor institutions (corroborated by ILSR, 
Broadband Communities Mag, and 
http://www.sandersville.net/Services.cfm)  
Sylvania   
Thomaston   






All Private Internet Service Providers in Georgia
July 2012 National Broadband Map Shapefiles




Advanced Technology Group 
AL-GA Wireless Broadband LLC 
Alltel 
AT&T Corp, Inc. 
AT&T Georgia 
AT&T Mobility LLC 
ATC 
ATC Broadband LLC 
Brantley Telephone, Inc. 
Bright House Networks, LLC 
Bulldog Cable Georgia, LLC 
Bulloch County Rural Telephone Cooperative, Inc. 
Carnesville Gumlog Broadband 
Cavalier Telephone 
CenturyLink 
CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS INC. 
Chickamauga Telephone Corporation 
Citizens 
Clearwire 




Covad Communications Company 
Cox Communications 
Cricket Communications, Inc. 
Darien Communications, Inc. 
EarthLink 
ETC Communications LLC 
FairPoint Communications 
Flint Cable Television 
Frontier Communications of Fairmount, LLC 
Frontier Communications of Georgia, LLC 
Glenwood Telephone Company 
Hargray 
Hart Telephone Company 
HughesNet 
iWispr.Net 
Kings Bay Communications 
KitePilot Wireless Internet 
Knology of Georgia, Inc 
Level 3 Communications, LLC 
Main Street Broadband 
Mediacom 
MediaStream 
Megapath Inc.  
Nextlink Wireless, Inc. 
NuLink Digital 
Pembroke Telephone Company, Inc 
Pineland Telephone Company, Inc. 
Plant Telephone Company 
Plant Tifnet 
Plantation Cablevision, Inc. 
Planters Communications, LLC 
Planters Rural Telephone Cooperative 
Progressive Rural Telephone 
Quitman Wireless 
Ringgold Telephone Company 
SGRITA 
Skycasters 





tw telecom of georgia l.p. 




Waverly Hall Telephone, LLC 
Wilkes Telephone and Electric Co. 
Windstream 
XO Communications Services, Inc. (Affiliated 
Entity) 
Zayo Group LLC 
Birch Communications, Inc. 
Birch Telecom of the South, Inc 
Brightlan.net 
Kennedy CableVision Inc. 
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LaGrange  32040  Businesses 
only  












31082    
Tifton 
CityNet* 
2007  RFoG  Voice, 
Data, 
Video  
Tifton  31794  SOLD 
Dalton 
Utilities 
2003  GPON  Voice, 
Data, 
Video  
Dalton  30720  19,000  
 
*Tifton CityNet was sold 





July 2012 National Broadband Map Shapefiles
National Telecommunications and Information Administration 
http://www.broadbandmap.gov/data-download
 
Municipal Broadband Providers in 
Georgia 
(These providers responded to NTIA’s call for information and are known to be 
municipal networks)  
ElbertonNET (Service to residents)  
City of Dublin (government, anchor institutions and some businesses only) 
City of LaGrange (government, anchor institutions and some businesses only) 
City of Monroe (Service to residents) 
City of Cairo (CNS) (Service to residents) 
City of Camilla (CNS) (Service to residents) 
City of Moultrie (CNS) (Service to residents) 
City of Thomasville (CNS) (Service to residents) 
Fort Valley Utility Commission (Service to residents) 
 
Non-Responsive Providers in Georgia 
(These providers did not respond to NTIA's call for information, some of these may 
provide broadband services in the community) 
Broadstar, LLC 
City of Augusta (Likely to provide service to community; lack of information)  
City of Cartersville- FiberCom (government, anchor institutions and some businesses 
only, see Appendix B) 
City of Milledgeville (Likely to provide service to community; lack of information)  
City of Statesboro (Likely to provide service to community; lack of information)  
Columbia Country Information Technology Department (BTOP Program, Appendix F) 
Dalton Utilities (Municipal network, see Appendix…) 
DirectPath 
Georgia Business Net 
Georgia Public Web, Inc.  (Non-profit serving Georgia) 
Gosuto Wireless Internet 
Habersham Electric Membership Corporation 
North Georgia Network Cooperative, Inc  (BTOP Program, see Appendix F) 
One Ring Networks 
Parker Fibernet 
Peachnet 
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"Public-private partnership designed to bring a middle-mile 
fiber network to [community anchor institutions in] 12 
counties across the lower Appalachian Valley in northwestern 






"The project proposes to employ a combination of 
discounted broadband service and specialized computers, 
technology training from an online state-of-the art support 
center customized to the community’s needs, public access 
to videophones at anchor institutions from coast to coast, 








"The Columbia County Community Broadband Network plans 
to build a 220-mile, county-wide fiber middle mile network to 
connect nearly 150 community anchor institutions and 
enhance health care, public safety, and government services 
throughout this eastern Georgia county. Anchor institutions 
expected to be connected at broadband speeds of 100 Mbps 
to 10 Gbps include K-12 schools, fire and emergency facilities, 
public libraries, Augusta Technical College, and the Columbia 








Comprehensive 50-state network benefitting approximately 
121,000 community anchors. The project proposes a large-
scale, public-private partnership to interconnect more than 
30 existing research and education networks, creating a 
dedicated 100-200 Gbps nationwide fiber backbone with 3.2 
terabits per second (TBps) total capacity that would enable 











The Expanding Broadband Access Across Georgia project 
proposes to build four new access points on Level 3’s existing 
broadband network to enable last mile providers to offer 
affordable high-speed services to underserved areas. The 
additional points of interconnection will offer broadband 
speeds between 50 Mbps and 10 Gbps on an open and 









This funding will support development of the Georgia 
Broadband Center of Excellence, a central hub that will 
design, develop and provide assistance for mapping data to 
local communities...This project was originally funded for 
broadband planning activities and two years of data 
collection. In September of 2010, this project was amended 
to extend data collection activities for an additional three 









Project partner North Georgia Technical College will offer 
online courses to users at each computer center in multiple 
disciplines, including accounting, automotive maintenance, 








Comprehensive program of computer training, wireless 
Internet access, broadband awareness marketing, and online 
content and applications to residents of 159 affordable and 
public housing developments and low-income communities 
in 50 cities and towns across 31 states and the District of 
Columbia. 
Communicatio
n Service for 





Communication Service for the Deaf, Inc. (CSD) intends to 
expand broadband adoption among people who are deaf and 
hard of hearing and provide them with online tools to more 
fully participate in the digital economy. The project proposes 
to employ a combination of discounted broadband service 
and specialized computers, technology training from an 
online state-of-the art support center customized to the 
community’s needs, public access to videophones at anchor 






$2,462,975   The project plans to connect community-serving institutions, 
like hospitals, schools, public health departments, and 
physicians’ offices by expanding the applicant’s current open 
access telehealth network to 67 additional community 
anchor sites. The partners plan to raise awareness of the 
benefits of broadband for healthcare through several 
outreach campaigns and training for rural physicians, non-
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